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LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND 
POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY: HISTORY CENSORSHIP, 
LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 
Dr. Bo Zhao
"One's good name determines the manner in which one perceives 
oneself and how one's peers and society relate to one. In effect, the 
only asset of many people, both public servants and those working in 
the private sector, is their reputation, which they cherish as life itself. 
This applies to both the living and the dead. We must protect the 
dignity of the deceased and their good name."1 
"The dead have no rights, and they suffer no wrongs."2 
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ABSTRACT 
It is a well-established doctrine in common law countries that law 
does not protect the reputation and privacy of the deceased. However, 
many countries, including W estem European democracies, protect them 
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to various extents by confining free expression and exchange of 
information and ideas regarding the dead and the past. Such an 
instrumental use of defamation law and privacy law can provide 
censorship of history with justifiable legal grounds. Based on an 
analysis of representative legal cases on posthumous reputation and 
posthumous privacy collected across the world, this article tries to offer 
a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of how legal protection of 
posthumous reputation and privacy can be used to carry out censorship 
of history. 
After a brief introduction, Section II will explain the concepts of 
posthumous reputation and posthumous privacy and their relationship 
with history censorship in theory, so that it is clear why history 
censorship can be achieved via protection of the two posthumous 
interests. Section III will briefly discuss the related legal apparatuses 
that can be used to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in 
different jurisdictions, whose abuse or misuse may lead to history 
censorship. Section IV will classify the collected legal cases on 
posthumous reputation and privacy into eight categories and discuss the 
circumstances of history censorship in each category. Section V will 
deepen the case analysis by illustrating the international criteria of free 
speech right protection, defining the icons of history censorship, 
explaining the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth 
confronted by judges, and clarifying the negative impacts on law itself. 
Section VI will further explore the interactions among law, politics and 
culture, which may account for the differentiated legal treatments of the 
two posthumous interests in different jurisdictions. The article 
concludes with an invitation to re-consider the law's role in resolving 
posthumous defamation and privacy controversies when historical 
narratives are involved, and proposes how to achieve better decisions in 
future cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Responsible History, Antoon De Baets drew a vivid scenario of 
how history censorship can be achieved in three effective ways. They 
are control of history archives, censorship of school history textbooks, 
and legal protection of the dead's reputation and privacy. 3 According to 
3. See ANTOON DEBAETS, RESPONSIBLE HISTORY 14 (2008) (explaining censorship of 
history is a category of abuse of history, which in more abstract sense, according to De 
Baets, is "the use of history with intent to deceive"); MARGARET MACMILLAN, THE USES 
AND ABUSES OF HISTORY xiii (Profile Books Ltd. 2010)(2008) (explaining that the abuse of 
3
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the author, defamation law functions, in particular, "as disguised 
instruments of censorship,"4 creating "a chilling effect on the expression 
and exchange of historical information and ideas. "5 This is well 
observed in the author's detailed analysis of twenty-two legal cases on 
posthumous defamation and privacy invasion collected from eight 
Western European countries from 1965 to 2000.6 
Beyond these legal cases and across the world, posthumous 
reputation and posthumous privacy under many circumstances are never 
simple or trivial issues, as they seem to be at first sight. To regard the 
two in such a way is both naive and a blind denial of the complexity of 
communal life. In reality, they involve too many other important issues 
beyond merely the dignity and respect of the deceased, ranging from 
collective memory, family repute and honor, monetary interests, group 
honor, national identity, religious dignity, diplomatic controversies, 
posthumous justice of war crime victims, biography writing, history 
controversies, free expression rights, euthanasia, etc. They do matter, 
especially for many communities where legal cases on reputation and 
privacy of the deceased have been brought before courts for resolution 
on the following grounds. 
First, families of the deceased usually care not only about the 
dead's reputation and privacy, but also more about their own reputation 
or honor and privacy affiliated with the dead' s, not even mentioning the 
economic interests in connection with the deceased' s names, which is 
particularly true in the case of dead public celebrities. Family members 
thus are the most strongly motivated protectors of the deceased's 
reputation and privacy. Second, people like close friends, colleagues or 
even unknown strangers who enjoyed benevolence and friendship of the 
deceased, admired their past achievements, or shared similar beliefs and 
memories with the deceased, or those who once participated in and 
supported joint projects, may all defend the deceased's reputation and 
honor to various extents against destruction of such goodness that they 
cherish in life. Furthermore, when leading politicians, national heroes 
( or heroines), military or religious martyrs, and public celebrities are 
affiliated with collective honor or reputation of a social, religious or 
political group, their reputations will not be only a personal or family 
issue, but rather a constituent of group honor and identity. Their 
history is defined as for the purposes of "creating one-sided or false histories to justify 
treating others badly, seizing their land, for example, or killing them."). 
4. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 3. 
5. See id. at 90. 
6. See id. at 3. 
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reputation will be under close monitoring and protection of the social 
group, or even political state. 
Lastly and most importantly, the protection of posthumous 
reputation and privacy depends eventually on how a society treats the 
deceased in general. If a society treats them seriously with considerable 
respect, dignity, and authority, and the society is willing to follow the 
traditions and conventions well established in communal life, it will 
have stronger protection of posthumous interests, including reputation 
and privacy of the dead. In general, a society with an individualist 
nature prefers less protection of the dead than one of communal nature. 
Moreover, moving from morality to legality, while common law 
countries in general firmly deny protection of posthumous reputation 
and privacy, this is not the case in other countries. For instance, in 
Germany, France, Malta, China, Israel, Taiwan, and Spain, the 
deceased' s reputation and privacy are protected under the fundamental 
right to human dignity, or under more general rules protecting leaders of 
political state, or under memory laws, etc. Other countries, like 
Thailand and Turkey, even have specific regulations forbidding 
defamation of dead monarchs and political leaders. Albeit being taken 
as fundamental to democracy, free speech does not always win the 
battle against reputation and privacy - including those of the dead -
even in democracies such as Germany and France. While protection is 
the case, how such laws balance the two posthumous interests with the 
right of free speech, and what make up the boundaries of protection 
deserve more detailed analysis. Though such legal practices and the 
underlying rationales seem eccentric to common law lawyers, they can 
be well explained and justified in specific political-social contexts. 
In light of this, a discussion of the above issues will help illustrate 
the fact that while law has its own internal morality and logic, 7 it can 
never be separated from specific political contexts, social ethos, and 
cultural backgrounds. It makes sense to analyze the related various 
legal apparatuses for protecting posthumous reputation and privacy, 
ranging from traditional blasphemy law, insult law and sedition law, to 
defamation law and privacy law, and to modem memory law and 
oblivion law. In explaining and comparing different approaches to 
posthumous reputation and privacy across the world, what is well 
observed in legal development is a general tendency shifting from 
privileged protection of reputation and privacy of the nobles and 
aristocrats, to more equal protection of ordinary people, from protection 
of the collective and political state, to more liberal protection of 
7. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4 (Yale Univ. Press 1969). 
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individuals. 
Following De Baets' initiative, this paper intends to bring his 
research of legal protection of posthumous reputation and privacy in 
history censorship a step further in three directions. First, it will 
broaden his analysis beyond Western Europe by analyzing more 
representative legal cases collected from across the world. Second, it 
will provide a more structured analysis of the law's potential role and 
various mechanisms in implementing history censorship via protecting 
posthumous reputation and privacy, as well as the accompanied 
problems. It will also explain the political and cultural backgrounds 
that have shaped the use of law for this purpose. Third, this paper will 
offer a more thorough explanation of the phenomenon by engaging in 
theoretical discussion of posthumous reputation and privacy and their 
general role in the social order. Thus, this paper is both analytical and 
descriptive, both theoretical and practical, with the main purpose to 
offer a thorough analysis of how legal protection of the deceased's 
reputation and privacy can be used to restrict free speech and achieve 
history censorship. 
Section II will explain the concepts of posthumous reputation and 
posthumous privacy and their relationship with history censorship in 
theory, so that it is clear why history censorship can be achieved by 
protection of the two posthumous interests. Section III discusses the 
legal apparatuses that can be manipulated to protect the deceased' s 
reputation and privacy in law development, whose abuse or misuse may 
lead to history censorship to different extents. Section IV will classify 
the collected legal cases on posthumous reputation and privacy into 
eight categories and discuss the circumstances of history censorship in 
each category. Section V will deepen the case analysis by discussing 
regional and international criteria of free speech right protection, 
defining the icons of history censorship in such legal cases, illustrating 
the dilemma confronted by judges between historical truth and judicial 
truth, and explaining the negative impacts on law itself. Section VI will 
further explore the interactions of law, politics and culture, which can 
account for the differentiated legal treatments of the two posthumous 
interests in different jurisdictions. It concludes with an invitation to re-
consider law's role in resolving posthumous defamation controversies 
when history narratives are involved, proposing how related history 
controversies should be resolved in the future. 
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II. POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP 
A. Reputation and Posthumous Reputation 
An individual's reputation is the societal-moral judgment of the 
person based on facts considered to be relevant by a community; such 
facts include personal acts and characteristics, and these judgments are 
based on certain moral standards of that community. 8 Reputation lies in 
reputational networks of various agents including friends, family 
members, colleagues, and all those who know a particular agent, even 
those who only read about the person but never meet him or her, or 
friends' friends. 9 Reputation is important to a community in terms of 
mutual trust and cooperation formation, mutual treatment, social 
learning, social control etc. 10 According to Robert Post, reputation can 
be understood as personal honor, indicating an individual's social status 
in a community, as intangible property consequent to personal 
achievements, and as human dignity based on equal respect. 11 
Reputation is a concept related to, or somewhat overlapped with 
other concepts such as honor, dignity, respect, privacy, and personal 
identity in general. An important aspect of reputation is identity. 
Identity comes into being usually when a sort of reputation of an 
individual or a social group becomes strong enough for one to be 
distinguished from others. Therefore reputation is vital to identity 
formation in individual life. Privacy as information control also plays a 
role in identity formation in individual life. 12 In particular, reputation 
and privacy cannot be separated from each other since both are effective 
means of personal information management and personal boundary 
control. 13 
8. See LAWRENCE McNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 21 - 22 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2007). 
9. See KENNETH H. CRAIK, REPUTATION: A NETWORK INTERPRETATION 6-9 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2009) (noting in Craik's terms, social networks and "the outer tires"). 
10. JOHN WHITFIELD, PEOPLE WILL TALK: THE SURPRISING SCIENCE OF REPUTATION 7, 
64, 102, 121 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2011 ). 
11. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 700 (1986); see also JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A 
HISTORY (Encounter Books 2007) (explaining a more detailed discussion of honour history 
and culture developments). 
12. See, e.g., Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy and Identity, in PRIVACY AND THE 
CRIMINAL LA w 43 (Erik Claes et al. eds., 2006); Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal 
Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. Rev. 371 (2011); Clare Sullivan, 
Privacy or Identity?, 2 INT'L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 289 (2008); Lisa M. Austin, Privacy, 
Shame and the Anxieties of Identity (Jan. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=2061748 (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). 
13. See generally Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & Pub. AFF. 3 
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Plainly, they are just two opposite presentations of one's self. 14 In 
many cases, disclosure of private matters that deviate from commonly 
accepted social morals, 15 can harm reputation, 16 even if such disclosure 
is true, as seen in common law torts of public disclosure of private 
issues and false light. 17 "Still, some invasion of privacy causes of 
action," according to Iryami, "do primarily involve loss of reputation 
and may inevitably lead themselves into defamation action." 18 
Reputation and privacy are closely affiliated with each other in that both 
are crucial components of human dignity, protected by constitutions and 
international treaties as fundamental human rights. Under the European 
Convention of Human Rights ("Convention"), a right of reputation is a 
right derived from Article 8, which prescribes the protection of family 
life or private life, or the right to privacy. 19 
(1998). 
14. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(Anchor 1959) ( explaining the external self and internal self). 
15. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1977) (arguing 
privacy is meant for personal secrecy that shall not be protected by law in general since it 
increases costs of market exchanges). 
16. A telling example is the American Steinbuch case in which Steinbuch's graphic 
bed stories were disclosed by his ex- girlfriend Jessica Cutler in her blog and publicized on 
the Internet before millions of people. Steinbuch sued for invasion of privacy, which 
damaged his reputation meanwhile. See Steinbuch v. Cutler, 463 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 
2006). 
17. See ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW AND SOCIETY 103- 29 (Thomson West 2007). 
Disclosure of private matters and false lights are two of the major aspects of privacy 
invasion according to Prosser; the other two are appropriation of images and the like, and 
the trespass of private spheres. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 
(1960). 
18. Raymond Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of 
Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006). 
19. Since Chauvy v. France, the right to reputation has been gradually established by 
the Eur. Ct. H.R. under Article 8, which was followed in its sequent rulings. See Pfeifer v. 
Austria, App. No. 12556/03, para 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["12556/03"],"itemid":["OO 
1-83294"]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02, para. 26 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 19, 2006), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-76894 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). The judgment was followed and strengthened later. White, App. No. 42435/02, 
para. 26. In the most recent Lindon v. France, for instance, Judge Loucaides in his 
concurring opinion criticized the over protection of freedom of speech in past cases by the 
Court and expressed the right to reputation should always be considered as safeguarded by 
Article 8, "as part and parcel of the right to respect for one's private life." Lindon v. France, 
App. Nos. 21279/02, 36448/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2007), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-82846 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
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Posthumous reputation, by analogy, is the social evaluation and 
assessment of the deceased's acts and characteristics. Plainly, 
posthumous reputation is what we think about the dead and their past 
acts. Our reputations "outlive us," Whitfield noted, "advancing or 
damaging our interests[, just as they did during our lives, for instance,] 
influencing the way people treat our children."20 Posthumous 
defamation accordingly refers to the communications or expressions 
that bring disrepute or dishonor to the deceased, degrading their social 
status, or making others think less of them. Posthumous reputation has 
been used to support the concept of posthumous harm in philosophical 
debates.21 According to the proponents, the deceased's reputation could 
be damaged.22 However, the philosophical arguments of posthumous 
harm is apparently not enough to provide a justification for legal 
protection in W estem democracies, unless the dead occupy a special 
status so that their reputations must be protected for other reasons like 
social ordering or public order.23 
After death, one's reputation in general will diminish or disappear 
gradually, as his or her reputational networks become weakened, 
information regarding the dead stops disseminating, and less and less 
people know the deceased. In certain circumstances, however, the 
deceased's reputation could grow even stronger.24 Similar to the living, 
the dead's reputation closely relates to concepts of privacy, honor, 
respect, and dignity. For instance, the disclosure of the deceased's 
private issues can alter their posthumous reputations in significant ways, 
in particular, the reputations of public figures and celebrities. 25 When 
we discuss posthumous reputation and the related legal issues, those 
20. WHITFIELD, supra note 11, at 7. 
21. See generally DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 15- 23 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (discussing the philosophical debate of 
posthumous harm); JOHN MARTIN FISCHER, THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 53, 126, 160, 179-
83 (Stanford Univ. Press 1993). 
22. See Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43, 57-60 (William T. Blackstone ed., 1974); 1 JOEL FEINBERG, 
Harm to Others, in THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 79-82 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1984). 
23. See generally infra Section VI.B. 
24. For instance, through biography and "the chorus of survivors", the deceased may 
be known by more people than before their death. See CRAIK, supra note 10, at 173-99. 
25. A more recent example is the swift of the public attitudes to Jimmy Savile, the 
famous British entertainer, after the posthumous disclosure of his sexual abuse cases. See 
Savile Abuse Claims: BBC Must 'Command Credibility', BBC NEWS (last updated Oct. 8, 
2012, 11: 13 PM), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-
l 9878433 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see generally Bo Zhao, Public Figures and Their 
Posthumous Reputation, 59-60 STORIA DELLA STORIOGRAFIA 87 (2011) (discussing public 
figures posthumuous reputation). 
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concepts are usually mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints and court 
verdicts to justify their claims. The big difference is that after death, the 
dead are no more and have no control of their own reputation and 
privacy in person, which mostly are at the mercy of the living. 
B. Posthumous Reputation and History Censorship 
"The dead belong to history[,]"26 and "history is replete with tales 
of people[,]"27 in particular dead people. This is true first with respect 
to dead public figures, especially political figures. When a defamation 
claim concerns a public figure, the related truth is relevant to narratives 
of public history. 28 No one would deny that human history is made by 
such persons and filled with their names and stories, although unknown 
ordinaries certainly are no less important. It is not exaggerated to say 
that the study of our past is the study of those who have left traces in 
history and memory. 29 Therefore history is in a sense the narrative 
composed of reputations of the deceased, the record of their past deeds, 
and the assessment of such deeds and their characteristics by the living. 
Intentional control of speeches and expressions regarding the dead' s 
reputation, either facts or opinions, may lead to censorship of history in 
different degrees on the following grounds. 
Posthumous reputation matters to the dead' s family and 
acquaintances in view of individual memories. 30 Changes in individual 
reputations of the deceased can threaten or alter the memory of their 
family members, which is possibly not satisfactory and therefore will 
encounter the living' s resistance and interference. Another important 
dimension of posthumous reputation lies in a collective sense. It is true 
that not only do individuals have personal reputations, but many 
collectives such as commercial institutions and NGOs also have 
personal reputations. 31 We also talk about reputation of a people or a 
26. See Pierre Guillaume, Law and History, VHO 31 (2008), available at 
http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres7 /PGLawhistory. pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014 ). 
27. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN DEAD 119 (2010). 
28. Daphne Barak-Erez, Collective Memory and Judicial Legitimacy: The Historical 
Narrative of the Israeli Supreme Court, 16 CAN. J. LAW & Soc. 93, 95 (2001). 
29. See Ariela J. Gross, The Constitution of History and Memory, in LAW AND THE 
HUMANITIES 416, 416-23 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010) (explaining the relationship 
between memory and history is controversial among historians and sociologists). 
30. See id. at 416-31 (discussing collective memory and individual memory and law's 
role in their formation). 
31. For instance, reputation of the American FDA was regarded as a powerful 
instrument in drug regulation. See generally David T. Zaring, Regulating by Repute, 110 
MICH. L. REV 1003 (2012). 
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national state, in more collective sense, such as the reputation of Jews 
and Chinese, or the Americans, or the French. Here, reputation is more 
related to collective identity or collective honor in that it can distinguish 
one ethnic group of people from another. The victim status of the Nazi 
Holocausts, for example, has been deemed a strong collective identity 
of the Jewish community. 32 Even for private associations, such as local 
clubs, collective reputation and honor matters when members act in 
improper ways, posing threats to internal order. 33 
In some cases, individual reputations and identities are regarded as 
heritage or legacy of ethnic groups, social groups or religious groups, so 
that as the representatives of collective identities, such reputations and 
identities deprive protection from well-accepted mores and ethics. In 
this regard, strong historical figures, such as Mao and Stalin, are not 
always approached in negative ways by their own nationals; many hold 
great respect for the two deceased and regard them as inviolable, great 
heroes. Similarly, Washington and Lincoln are icons of the American's 
national characters and their reputations are public goods, albeit still 
under public scrutiny. 34 Their posthumous reputations are significant 
parts of national history and national identities. 
Since the dead are important to our understanding and assessment 
of the past,35 they are important targets of history censorship. Thus an 
unavoidable part of history censorship is the "systematical control" of 
posthumous reputation. This includes a control of both factual accounts 
of the dead' s past behaviors and the related judgments. This includes a 
twist of "well established truth of the past", or as selective use of the 
past, or as intended blurs of facts or opinions, etc. Political states are 
not the sole censor. Posthumous reputation is related to history 
censorship in the following ways. 
First, the dead themselves are the censors of post mortem 
32. Amit M. Schejter, 'The Pillar of Fire by Night, to Shew Them Light': Israeli 
Broadcasting, the Supreme Court and the Zionist Narrative, 29 MEDIA CULTURE Soc. 916, 
929 (2007) (arguing the significance of Holocaust victims status in the creation of a shared 
collective identity for the Jewish community). 
33. In Bath Club, the plaintiff was expelled for his defaming another member's 
deceased father, which was deemed as injurious to the character and interests of the club. 
See generally F.P. Walton, Libel upon the Dead and the Bath Club Case, 9 J. COMP. LEGIS. 
& INT'L L. 1 (1927); see also Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons -
A Comparison Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 5 
108, 116 (2001). 
34. Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 743, 745 (1986). 
35. For instance, see Craik's explanation of how biography studies relate closely to 
cultural history and their relationship with posthumous reputation. See CRAIK, supra note 
10, at 194-99. 
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reputations. Before death, those who cherish their own names would 
destroy, hide, or alter the materials and information that may have 
negative impacts on their reputation afterwards. Such efforts include 
autobiography or biography writing under the control of the 
protagonists themselves, so that their desired portraits or images can 
preclude the negative judgment of others after death. 36 This is a kind of 
self-censorship for self-protection, or for a protection of their legacy and 
family interests, when the deceased's names matter a lot to surviving 
families. 
Second, close relatives, family members, and heirs have direct 
interests in the dead's good reputation. Not only will they protect the 
dead's reputation, but they also are more willing to protect their own 
and their family's reputations that are in most cases closely-affiliated 
with the deceased. 37 Those people may encounter mental distress and 
personal, emotional harm consequent to defamation of their beloved 
deceased. There are monetary interests involved in the dead's 
reputation and privacy as well.38 The dead's family may be the most 
motivated censors and they can intimidate critics who dare to stand out 
against their memory of the dead. This is especially true when the 
deceased's families hold high social status that may be even more 
degraded by posthumous defamation, were there no strong defense from 
the families before the public. Such families can censor negative 
information regarding the dead with considerable economic and 
political resources available. 39 
Third, many people other than family members and designated 
heirs bear no less strong motivations to defend the deceased's 
reputation. Numerous foundations, institutions and associations of non-
governmental nature are ready to take necessary steps to protect the 
dead for whose remembrance they have been established. They are 
36. Id. at 190; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of 
Biography, 43 STAN. L. Rev. 299 (2011) (discussing the relation between law and biography 
writing in the U.S.). 
37. Following Brewer, family is the first natural honor groups, which we are all, 
affiliated with. See BOWMAN, supra note 12, at 4. 
38. Especially in the cases of publicity rights and copyrights involve. See MADOFF, 
supra note 28, at 130-51. 
39. According to Post, there is a shift from government silencing powerless people to 
powerful people silencing the powerless behind state power. See ROBERT POST, CENSORSHIP 
AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURE REGULATION (Getty Research Inst. 1998). 
MacKinnon has a similar expression: "The operative definition of censorship accordingly 
shifts from government silencing what powerless people say, to powerful people violating 
powerless people into silence and hiding behind state power to do it." CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 10 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)(1993). 
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history museums, private foundations, war crime memorial associations, 
victims associations, religious groups, and even commercial 
institutions.40 This also includes determined individual supporters of 
deceased politicians, war heroes (heroines), religious martyrs, or even 
celebrities like Diana, Princess of Wales. They make open protests on 
streets,41 publish advocates in newspapers,42 initiate petitions against 
defamers of their religion, 43 and participate in litigation. 44 In many 
cases, their motivations could be their love of and trust in the deceased 
politicians, such as Gandhi, and dead religious leaders, such as the 
Vatican Pope,45 or merely sympathy and determination to seek justice 
for the deceased, or shared contribution to the same ideal or project,46 
etc. 
Fourth, a community as a whole can play the role of censorship in 
40. For example, to protect Jobs' likeness, Apple considered suing in California 
against a Chinese company that made toy products by illegal appropriation of Jobs' likeness. 
Tecca, Apple May File Lawsuit Against the Makers of Disturbingly Realistic Steve Jobs 
Doll, YAHOO NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012, 9:06 PM), available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/technology-blog/apple-may-file-lawsuit-against-makers-
disturbingly-realistic-020637702.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
41. As seen in the recent popular protests against describing Trayvon Martin as a 
potential killer and a convict, as well as George Zimmerman's acquittal. Lizette Alvarez & 
Cara Buckley, Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07 /15/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-
trayvon-martin.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
42. As seen in Lehideux and lsorni v. France, in which the plaintiffs published an 
advertisement on the local newspaper to remind the French people of Philippe Petain, the 
formal collaborator of Nazi occupation. See Lehideux & Isorni v. France, App. No. 
24662/94, para. 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-58245 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
43. As seen by the numerous protests of Muslims against defamations of their religious 
prophets. 
44. Across the world, many associations consisted of lawyers, activists, academics and 
veterans are actively supporting the victims of comfort women from Japan, Korea, China 
and other Asian countries to seek legal remedies in Japan. For a detailed discussion of the 
international support, see PEIPEI QIU, CHINESE COMFORT WOMEN: TESTIMONIES FROM 
IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEX SLAVES 184- 90 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
45. See the libel trial of Robert Katz regarding the accused silence of Pope Pius XII in 
Nazi occupation. See Bruce Weber, Robert Katz, Who Wrote of Nazi Massacre in Italy, 
Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/201 Oil 0/22/arts/22katz.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (the case 
will be further discussed in Section IV(H)). 
46. As such in the military struggles of the Partisans in Spain, Italian and France 
against German occupation, which were overlooked or underestimated during the Cold War 
Period, many partisans have sued to correct the "wrong version" of the past military 
conflicts. See, e.g., Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 29, 2004), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
13
Zhao: Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy: Hist
Published by SURFACE, 2014
52 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 42:1 
order to protect its collective identities and honor, so that the past may 
only be portrayed in a much-favored way and the deceased are 
forbidden to be criticized. In this context, collective morals are a firm 
source and confirmation of potential censorship. For instance, a 
German local community tried to silence a young researcher who 
investigated its previous support of the Nazi regime, and her research 
would downplay the previous collective identity of resisting Nazi 
policies.47 Another situation involves "vulnerable" racial or religious 
communities (groups) that are sensitive and paranoid to certain 
expressions and speeches about their past, so that they need official 
protection for control. 48 Such collective identity and emotional interest 
may generate a strong atmosphere or ethos to support censorship. 
Finally, the strongest censors are the political state in abstract. 
Political states and ruling parties need political legitimacy and 
justification of their ruling. For totalitarian or dictatorial states, history 
plays a considerable role in providing legitimacy for political leaders 
such as Stalin and Saddam Hussein.49 In China and North Korea, 
history has been tightly controlled for political use. 50 In such countries, 
open discussion of the dead's name, and of dead political figures in 
particular, is not allowed. Some countries, such as Turkey, even have 
direct statutes to protect dead leaders' reputation and honor. In sharp 
contrast, most democracies draw legitimacy from ballots and rule of 
law. They do not have a strong motive to censor history for legitimacy. 
This, however, does not say that they do not conduct history censorship 
or similar activities. It only means that there is no systematic history 
4 7. See the story of German author Anja Rosmus-Wenninger, which will be discussed 
below. Corinna Coulmas & Saul Friedlander, Memory and Identity Problems in Post-War 
Germany According to Age Groups, available at http://www.corinna-coulmas.eu/memory-
and-identity-problems-in-post-war-germany-according-to-age-groups.html (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014). 
48. For instance, Canadian Human rights jurisprudence supports the concept that 
"Islam needs singular protection against defamatory speech." Allison G. Belnap, 
Defamation of Religions: A Vague and Overbroad Theory that Threatens Basic Human 
Rights, BYU L. Rev. 635, 676 (2010). 
49. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 17-18. 
50. For example, children of North Korea were taught that the South started the 
Korean War in 1950s and was defeated by the North; with the interference of Soviet Unions 
and China also not mentioned as the critical support of its war efforts. See Sarah Buckley, 
North Korea's "Creative" History, BBC (July 25, 2003), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). China's 
official history is no better than the North Korean's version, however. Howard W. French, 
China's Textbooks Twist and Omit History, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/intemational/asia/06textbook.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). As the high school history teacher Chen Minghua said in Shanghai, the closer the 
Chinese history gets to the present, the more political it becomes. Id. 
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censorship in W estem democracies. Instead they have been troubled by 
other problems of a different nature at different historical periods.51 
III. THE LEGAL APPARATUSES FOR PROTECTION 
Be it interests of the dead, their surviving families, their associates, 
affiliated social groups, special communities, or political states, 
nowadays the control ( or censorship) of speeches and information 
regarding the past has to be carried out through legal means; otherwise, 
it lacks legitimacy and cannot be accepted in modem politics. In the 
following, different legal apparatuses that can be used to protect 
posthumous reputation and privacy will be briefly discussed for the 
further case analysis. 
A. Blasphemy Law, Insult Law and Sedition Law 
As an old legal instrument, blasphemy laws protect religious belief 
and dead religious figures in many countries. 52 Many W estem 
countries, such as the United States, have abolished blasphemy laws 
while others keep such laws merely on paper, a step away from 
abolishment. 53 Some countries, such as Ireland and Russia, have 
recently enacted blasphemy laws. 54 As Uta Melzer noted, such laws 
exist in Asia and the Middle East, particularly in Islamic countries that 
51. For instance, history can be controlled to strengthen national identity formation 
and to enhance political transition by avoiding hatred and revenge among previously 
conflicted social groups in a community. See Josep Maria Tamarit Sumalla, Transition, 
Historical Memory and Criminal Justice in Spain, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 729 (2011). For 
example, see the court's role in Israeli state formation (Barak-Erez) and the use of oblivion 
law in Spain's restoration of democracy. See id.; Miren Gutierrez, Spain: Historical 
Amnesia on Display, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (Nov. 28, 2012), available at 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2012/11 /spain-historical-amnesia-on-display/ (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
52. They "act as a sanctioned limitation on the right of expression." Belnap, supra note 
49, at 670-71. Note that many UN commission resolutions over years "have asked state 
governments and international bodies to provide protection against defamation of religions 
in increasingly robust terms." Id. at 664. 
53. See generally id. at 670-79 (discussing such laws in most OIC (Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation) member states and other western countries). For a country-to-country 
list of Blasphemy laws in the Middle East see Country-by-Country Blasphemy Laws in the 
Middle East, SELFSCHOLAR (Dec. 19, 2012), available at 
http://selfscholar.wordpress.com/2012/12/19/blasphemy-laws-in-the-middle-east/ (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
54. Though Ireland decriminalized defamation, Article 36 of the 2009 Defamation Act 
introduced blasphemy as an offense. PATTI McCRACKEN, INSULT LAWS: INSULTING TO 
PRESS FREEDOM-A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF INSULT LA ws IN 20 I 0, at 16 (Ronald Koven ed., 
2012), available at Freedom House. 
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campaign to criminalize defamation of religion, and such laws usually 
reach beyond religious protection, restricting calls for political reform. 55 
For religious reasons, dead religious figures are not allowed to be 
criticized and commented about negatively, which is a strong category 
of repression of free speech. 
Some jurisdictions directly protect honor and reputation of the 
nobles by insult laws without even concealing the intention, which 
criminalizes posthumous defamation. Such laws usually protect 
monarchs, kings or state heads (nowadays) not necessarily in non-
democracies. Rulers, as De Baets commented, "have recorded [certain] 
version[ s] of history to secure their posthumous fame[ s,] and their 
successors often abide by [such] version[s]."56 For instance, the 1959 
Thai legislation protects the deceased Monarchs, 57 the 1951 Turkish law 
secures the legacy of Ataturk, 58 and Iranian law punishes insults against 
the memory of Imam Khomeini. 59 Meanwhile, Kings and emperors 
"proved sensitive" in other countries such as Morocco, Kuwait and 
Bahrain.60 Furthermore, insult laws also protect the honor of political 
figures and public officials in some European countries, including the 
dead. For example, Article 490 and Article 491 of the Spanish Penal 
Code punish insults of the royal family and use of their images, 
including the king's ancestors. 61 French law prohibited insult of heads 
of state under its 1881 legislation for a long period until the annulations 
by European Union ("EU") judges that French law has violated a 
protester's right to freedom of expression. 62 In general, as Whiteman 
55. UTA MELZER, INSULT LAWS: IN CONTEMPT OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EVOLUTION OF 
INSULT LAWS IN 2009, at 8-11 (Ronald Koven ed., 2010), available at World Press Freedom 
Committee. 
56. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 77. 
57. MELZER, supra note 56, at 165-69. 
58. See id. at 40 (describing the Law on Crimes Committed Against Atatiirk (Law No. 
5816)). 
59. See id. at 192 ( describing Article 514 of the 1991 Islamic Penal Code oflran). 
60. Id. at 9. 
61. C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 490, 491 (Spain), available at 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-l 995-25444 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
62. A Parisian bystander at a parade uttered the words "Hoohoo" when President 
Charles de Gaulle passed by, and this merited a conviction for insult under article 26 of the 
1881 Law on Freedom of the Press. But this law has been challenged by the verdict of the 
ECtHR in March 2013 in that France has violated a protester's right to freedom of 
expression by fining him. See Eon v. France, App. No. 26188/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. March 14, 
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO l -1177 42 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Peter Allen, French President Insults no Longer an 
Automatic Criminal Offence, TELEGRAPH (Jul. 25, 2013), available at 
http://www. telegraph .co. uk/news/worldnews/francois-ho llande/10203 14 2/French-president-
insults-no-longer-an-automatic-criminal-offence.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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pointed out, there is a long tradition in European countries of protecting 
the nobility of upper classes, which is represented by France and 
Germany.63 
With a long tradition, sedition law, in particular seditious libel and 
seditious words, 64 can be manipulated for history censorship while 
sought to protect reputations of selected people to prevent social 
disorder and public incitement. "The point of sedition law was to 
protect the status quo, the regime-and the reputation of elite people, 
respectable people in general."65 As Mayton said, the law of seditious 
libel has shifted its emphasis from protecting "government or 
governmental officials" to restricting "the potential of dissident speech 
to bring about illegal acts" in modem times. 66 "In most of the mature 
democracies, the law of sedition has now either formally been rescinded 
or is largely defunct", 67 but some democracies still keep such a law or 
even revive it. 68 
B. Defamation Law 
Defamation is both a criminal offense and a civil offense, 69 and can 
be conducted by means of libel in written forms and slander in spoken 
forms. Defamation of the dead can be punished in some jurisdictions. 
63. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 Yale 
L.J. 1279 (2000). 
64. Post, supra note 12, at 736. 
65. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE'S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 54 (Stanford Univ. Press 1st ed. 
2007). 
66. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 91 (1984). 
67. Memorandum on the Malaysian Sedition Act 1948, ARTICLE 19, at 6 (2003), 
available at http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/malaysia-sedit.03.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
68. For instance, the Australian Federal Parliament passed a law about sedition in late 
2005, which was criticized by scholars. See, e.g., George Williams, Op-Ed., Speak up in 
Defence of Free Speech, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/speak-up-in-defence-of-free-speech/2006/05/29/1148 
754937566.html?page=fullpage (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a list of these countries, 
mostly common law countries, updated to 2010 at the official website of Australian Federal 
Parliament see Roy Jordan, In Good Faith: Sedition Law in Australia, PARLIAMENT OF 
AUSTRALIA (2010), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_ 
Departments/Parliamentary_ Library/Publications_ Archive/archive/sedition (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014). 
69. There are only about a dozen of countries that decriminalize defamation while the 
majority keeps it, even if for most democracies they are merely laws on paper. See an 
analysis of criminal defamation by ARTICLE 19. See Defamation Maps, ARTICLE 19, 
available at http://www.articlel9.org/defamation/map.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) 
(analysis of criminal defamation). 
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In the first instance, when there are no particular laws protecting the 
deceased's reputation and honor, they might still be protected by courts 
under ordinary defamation law. In general, continental law jurisdictions 
protect the deceased' s reputation and dignity to different extents. For 
instance, French courts protected the deceased's reputation and privacy 
especially when public figures are involved. 70 Maltese courts protected 
the reputation of the deceased Prime Minister, Dr. Bofa, when he was 
alleged by Journalist Mizzi of abusing power in land planning for 
private interest. 71 
In the second instance, there are direct clauses in criminal law and 
civil law to protect the deceased's reputation and privacy in some 
jurisdictions. For instance, the Indonesian Penal Code explicitly 
protects the deceased's reputation and likeness. 72 Sections 305 and 306 
of the Cameroon Penal Code prescribe that defamation of the dead is 
punishable if the intent is "to injure the honor or reputation" of a living 
spouse or heirs. 73 Similar laws can be found in Turkey, although the 
intention is to protect the affiliated living's reputations. 74 One may also 
note that the Sudanese Penal Code punishes any person who "imputes to 
any honorable living or dead person by express words, implicitly, by 
writing or via indicative signs accusations of Zina or Sodomy, or 
illegitimacy commits Qadhf."75 This is not limited to developing 
countries. Article 188 of German Penal Code prescribes that the 
deceased's parents and children have the legal standing to sue76; Article 
175 of the Swiss Criminal Code punishes defamation of the dead who 
have been deceased no less than thirty years. 77 Israeli defamation law 
70. For instance, see the French Pion case regarding the late President Mitterrand. See 
Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 18, 2004), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-617 60 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014) (case regarding the late French President Mitterrand). 
71. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2012), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 
4, 2014). 
72. MELZER, supra note 56, at 157- 58. 
73. See id. at 74. 
74. See id. at 37-40 (highlighting Article 130 of the Turkish Penal Code). 
75. Id. at 211 (quoting Article 157 of the Sudanese Penal Code). 
76. See, e.g., Hannes Rosier, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights - An 
Analysis of US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 153 
(2008); Gotz Bottner, Protection of the Honour of Deceased Persons-A Comparison 
Between the German and the Australian Legal Situations, 13 BOND L. REV. 121, 121 (2001), 
available at epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= l 199&context=blr (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
77. SCHWEIZERJSCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB], CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] [CRIMINAL 
CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, AS 311 (2014), art. 175 (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/311_0/a175.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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also accepts complaints against defamation of the dead. 78 
In contrast, common law countries do not protect posthumous 
reputation and privacy. The rationale is that since the dead are no 
longer living, they cannot be harmed after death. 79 In common law 
jurisdictions, particularly in the U.S., reputation is a personal matter and 
the right cannot be inherited by the living. 80 "Though most rules in 
modem defamation law defy mechanical application, the centuries-old 
rule against liability for defamation of dead 
people kicks in automatically."81 Family members or heirs of the dead 
have no legal standing to sue on the deceased's behalf.82 Also, 
"defamation of a deceased person generally does not give rise to a right 
of action at common law in favor of the surviving spouse, family, or 
relatives who are not defamed."83 However, they can initiate lawsuits to 
protect their own reputation and privacy, so that the deceased's name 
could be restituted to some extent. 84 
78. Section 5 of the 1967 Defamation Law (amended version) prescribes that 
"[ d]efamatory statements regarding a Deceased Person that are published after his or her 
death shall be treated as the defamation of a living person, but do not constitute cause for a 
civil claim or a private criminal complaint, and no indictment shall be submitted for an 
offense under this section unless it is requested by the deceased's spouse or one of his 
children, grandchildren, parents, brothers or sisters." Defamation Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 
254, Sec. 5 (1967) (Isr.), available at www.nevo.co.il/law_html/LawOl/019 _002.htm (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also Elad Peled, Israeli Law of Defamation: A Comparative 
Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 753 
(2011 ), available at www.uiowa.edu/-tlcp/TLCP%20Articles/20-3/Peled%20Final.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 3 2014). 
79. See Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088 ("the rule on defamation of the dead is 
consistent through-out common law jurisdictions."). 
80. Libel. Defamation of Dead Person. Injury to Reputations of Surviving Relatives, 40 
COLUM. L. REV. 1267, 1268- 69 (1940), available at www.jstor.org/stable/1117780 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (describing the rationales underlying the denial in majority of 
American cases). 
81. Lisa Brown, Dead but not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for 
Defamation of the Dead, 67 TEX. L. Rev. 1525, 1525 (1989). 
82. Iryami supra note 19, at 1089- 95. 
83. Smolensky, supra note 82, at 23 (quoting 50 AM. JuR. 2o Libel and Slander§ 336 
(2014)). 
84. This indirect approach is successful at least in the U.S. in some occasions. See 
Iryami, supra note 19, at 1095-96. In the UK, there are a couple of cases in which the living 
family of the dead won in exceptional cases. For instance, Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in 
court from a publisher alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he 
was a guest of the British Government. See News in Brief Mrs. Sukarno Wins Libel Suit, 
MILWAUKEE J., June 21, 1974, part 1 pg. 3, available at http://news.google.com/ 
newspapers?nid= 1499&dat= 197 40621 &id=TwgqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=8SgEAAAAIBAJ &pg 
=4238,14080 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). The case was the first time in British court that any 
one not directly implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements 
made about a dead person. Id. (Mrs. Sukarno won an apology in court from a publisher 
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C. Privacy Law and Others 
Reputations during life are also protected by the right of privacy. 85 
Due to the close affiliation of privacy with reputation,86 the dead's 
privacy is also closely related to their posthumous reputation. In 
particular, laws regarding public disclosure of private affairs and false 
lights may protect the dead' s reputations to a certain degree. 87 After 
death, disclosure of private issues can have a great impact on the dead' s 
reputation, which we can observe in many real cases. 88 To put the dead 
under a false light by disclosing their names, private activities, or their 
likeness can be against the dead' s will to be left alone post mortem and 
can create a misleading impression of the dead, harming their dignity 
and reputation, and in many occasions, also the honor and dignity of the 
dead's family in the eyes of the living. 89 
In continental law countries, the dead' s privacy may have been 
protected and the living family members are allowed to sue on their 
behalf. For example, French courts protect the dead's privacy and 
reputation even if there is no statutory law explicitly protecting the 
interest of the dead. 90 Another example is that privacy laws of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia; both protect the privacy of the dead on 
the ground of human dignity. 91 However, common law countries do not 
protect the privacy of the dead, since privacy is a personal issue and one 
alleging her husband having sexual relations with a call girl when he was a guest of the 
British Government. The case was the first time in British court that any one not directly 
implicated in the publication successfully sued over defamatory statements made about a 
dead person). 
85. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 123. 
86. See supra Section II.A. 
87. For a more detailed discussion of posthumous privacy in light of Prosser's 
categorizations, see DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 124-26. 
88. Again, for example, see that case of the British Jimmy Savile. See Reuters, Jimmy 
Savile: NSPCC Say Report May Help Victims to Come to Terms with Abuse, TELEGRAPH 
(Jan. 12, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/jimmy-
savile/9796852/Jimmy-Savile-NSPCC-say-report-may-help-victims-to-come-to-terms-with-
abuse.html (last visited Dec.3, 2014). 
89. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 
14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-81066 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (see for instance, the French case in which a dead local 
politician's death scene pictures were published by a newspaper after his assassination). 
90. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014). 
91. Analysis and Translation by Martin Duchac, Student Research Assistant (June 23, 
2011) (on file with author). 
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cannot sue on the dead's behalf.92 Obviously the dead cannot feel 
humiliation and shame post mortem.93 The living may lodge cases 
because their own privacy is directly involved or they may suffer from 
emotional distress upon privacy invasion of the dead. 94 In this regard, 
even the American law protects the living family's privacy involving 
death-scene photographs to provide "refuge from a sensation-seeking 
culture. "95 
Privacy laws that can indirectly protect the dead's reputation are 
laws protecting publicity rights after death, including illegal 
appropriation of the dead's likeness, illegal use of the dead's names, 
false lights, and publication of private affairs. 
Closely related to illegal appropriation of personal likeness are the 
right to publicity and copyright that make it possible to generate 
revenue after one's death. The first allows a person to control the 
exploitation of his image and the later to control his creations.96 For 
example, the protections from the right to publicity and copyright can 
continue after death in the U.S. In recent years such protections 
(rights), according to Madoff, "have grown in strength and duration, 
providing posthumous protections never before seen in history", though 
strictly limited to economic interests, as opposed to reputational 
interests.97 But, as the author argued, in the U.S. context at least, both 
rights co-exist with reputation and personality, and they cannot be 
separated from each other with clear-cut lines.98 
Furthermore, confidentiality rules of some special professions 
request service providers to keep personal data of the deceased from 
92. Iryami, supra note 19 at 1097- 99 (arguing "the common law rule that prohibits a 
cause of action for defamation of the dead is analogous to its rule for invasion of privacy 
upon the dead", and "courts and authorities have long assumed that one's legal interest in 
privacy ends upon death."). 
93. Paul Roth, Privacy Proceedings and the Dead, 11 PRIV. L. & PoL'Y REP. 50 
(2004); see also Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice, AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMMISSION 355 (2008), available at 
http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/8.%20Privacy%20of%>20Deceased%20Individuals/intr 
oduction#_ftnl (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
94. See also Daily Mail Reporter, Westboro Baptist Church Vows to "Quadruple' its 
Protests at Military Funerals After Supreme Court Rules in its Favour, MAILONLINE, 
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1362288/Westboro-Baptist-Church-
victory-Supreme-Court-rules-favour-protests-military-funerals.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014) (describing the story of Matthew Snyder, a deceased American soldier). 
95. National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
96. See MADOFF, supra note 28, at 131 for Madoff's account of the two rights under 
the U.S. law that protects the dead's interest. 
97. Id. at 131. 
98. Id. at 131-40, 148-49. 
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unintended disclosure, which can pose potential harm to the dead and 
their families. For example, medical data of the deceased and personal 
information of customers in hands of their lawyers is under protection 
of confidentiality law, so that those professions would not be destructed 
by such breach. 99 
D. Memory Law and Oblivion Law 
Privacy law and defamation law are the two major legal 
instruments to protect the deceased's reputation. Their locus is at the 
individual level. In contrast, there are also legal instruments protecting 
the dead's reputation in a collective sense. Such laws protect 
reputation, honor, identities, or dignity of various social groups and 
communities whose degradation naturally lowers the reputation and 
honor of their members as a consequence. 
The first category includes memory laws that are widely criticized 
as against international human rights law. For instance, the 1990 
French Memory Law criminalizes denial of the Jewish Holocaust. 100 
The law, on the one hand, punishes the denial of the Holocaust that 
particularly amounts to a rejection of the Jewish victims' social status 
and harm to their dignity. On the other hand, a court-supported 
historiography functions as a tool to combat racism, negationism, and 
revisionism. 101 Similar laws can be found in European countries such as 
Belgium, Poland, Germany, Austria, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic. 102 Other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, and 
Switzerland, take a more general approach to cope with denials of all 
99. For medical data confidentiality, see D.S. James & S. Leadbeatter, Confidentiality, 
Death and the Doctor, 49 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 1, 1--4 (1996); Jessica Wilen Berg, Grave 
Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality, 84 CONN. L. REV. 81 
(2001); Mary Donnelly & Maeve McDonagh, Keeping the Secrets of the Dead? An 
Evaluation of the Statutory Framework for Access to Information About Deceased Persons , 
LEGAL STUDIES (2010). 
100. Loi 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant a reprimer tout acte raciste, antisemite ou 
xenophobe [Law No. 90-615 of 13 July 1990 on the Punishment of All Racist, Anti-Semitic 
or Xenophobic], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETIE 
OF FRANCE], Feb. 24, 2004 (also known as the Gayssot Act, Law No. 90-615 of July 13, 
1990); see also Roger W. Smith, Legislating against Genocide Denial: Criminalizing 
Denial or Preventing Free Speech, 4 ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 128, 133 (2009). 
101. Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and Their Implications: 
Institutionalizing Social Harmony, HUMANITY rN ACTION, available at 
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/117-memory-laws-in-france-and-their-
implications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
102. See Jacqueline Lechtholtz-Zey, The Laws Banning Holocaust Denial, GPN 
BULLETIN (2012), available at http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/O/docs/ 
Holocaust_Denial_Updated_2.8.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing such domestic 
laws and international treaties). 
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crimes against humanity, including the Holocaust. 103 
Protection of posthumous reputation and dignity can be found in 
rehabilitation laws that aim to relieve the deceased victims and their 
surviving families from unjust political accusations. In the early 1990s, 
most former communist countries in Eastern Europe promulgated 
rehabilitation laws. 104 Since then, family members of the dead victims 
have started to bring justice to the deceased, trying to restore their honor 
and dignity by law. 105 In addition, posthumous rehabilitation also 
involves the dead victims of atrocities and massacres such as Katyn, 
who are still denied victim status by the Russian authority. 106 
A similar situation involves the truth commissions established in 
many countries by law after political traumas and military conflicts. 
Whether the dead victims can be offered restoration and justice, and the 
dead perpetrators would be prosecuted, is crucial not only for future 
peace construction, but also for the dead victims' dignity and reputation, 
and their remaining families. 
In this respect, however, amnesty laws may function as a shield to 
retroactively exempt political leaders and military leaders from criminal 
charges of their past crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. 
For instance, the Spanish Amnesty Law was democratically voted and is 
still valid today. 107 In the deeply wounded Spanish community, 
reprisals and revenges would have led to social disorder and distracted 
its transition to democracy without this law. 108 In some truth 
103. Id. (under the rubric of hate speech, incitement speech, and racial discrimination). 
104. LAVINIA STAN, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA: THE 
POLITICS OF MEMORY 163- 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). For instance, the Russian 
Rehabilitation Act's purpose is "the rehabilitation of all victims of political repression who 
were prosecuted on the territory of the Russian Federation after 7 November 1917, and 
restoration of their civil rights." Id.; see Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 
29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 2013), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
105. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2001) (for instance, 
a brother of the dead victim of the political conviction by the previous Polish Communist 
regime, appealed before the ECtHR for a violation of his right to fair trial under Article 6 of 
the Convention and won). 
l 06. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
107. Ackar Kadribasic, Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of 
Spain from an International Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANS'L JUST. & HUM. RTS. 
132, 132- 33 (2010). 
108. Id. at 132- 33 (in contrast, the Chilean amnesty law is a product of the military 
before the end of totalitarian ruling in contrast to exempt military leaders from future 
charges). 
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commissions' reports, even names of the perpetrators were not 
mentioned because of the existence of such amnesty law. 109 This means 
that the dead perpetrators cannot be singled out or named responsible 
for past crimes and their reputations remain somehow intact. 
However, the recent practice of international law has challenged 
such an approach to promote political transition at the price of justice 
and human rights. The Special Court for Sierra Leone decided that the 
amnesties granted by a peace agreement are no bar to prosecutions 
before it. 110 Also, the 2005 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147 
prescribes, as one of the ways of giving satisfaction, "an official 
declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation 
and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the 
victim." 111 
What's related to the deceased's reputation in a fundamental sense 
is human dignity and respect, which have been protected by the laws 
both at the national level and at the international level. The idea is that 
even if the dead are no longer living, they still deserve the minimum 
respect and decent treatment as passed human beings. 112 In 
constitutions of many Western countries, in particular European 
countries, human dignity has been regarded as the fundamental right to 
include individual honor, reputation and private life (family life). For 
example, German law recognizes dignity of human beings covering not 
only the living, but also the dead. 113 
A last note is the legal protection of the dead' s dignity and 
reputation after enforced disappearance that has been recognized in an 
important international treaty promulgated in December 2010: The 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. Article 24, clauses 4 & 5( c ), of the law 
prescribe that "the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to 
obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation", and 
109. Id. at 132. 
110. See Simon M. Meisenberg, Legality of Amnesties in International Humanitarian 
Law: The Lome Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 86 INT'L Rev. RED 
CROSS 837, 843 (2004) (as the first decision to deny the validity of amnesty law, this 
decision is of critical importance for the development oflnternational Humanitarian Law). 
111. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. AIRES/ 4/1 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
112. A reason why in most communities we are asked to keep silence in graveyards 
and cannibalism is regarded as against humanity even in times of war and famines . See DE 
BAETS, supra note 4, at 124- 25. 
113. See Hannes Rosler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights An Analysis of 
US. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 153, 196 (2008). 
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reparation includes not only material and moral damages, but also other 
forms such as "satisfaction, including restoration of dignity and 
reputation." This law defines victims as "the disappeared person and 
any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced 
disappearance." 114 
The above are the relevant domestic laws and international laws 
regarding protection of the dead's reputation, privacy and dignity from 
different perspectives. Laws protecting the free speech rights of 
individuals shall also be considered in this context, since on the 
contrary, their stronger protection means a weaker protection of the 
dead's reputation and dignity. Protection of free speech and its 
relationship to posthumous reputation protection will be further 
discussed in Section V. 
IV. LEGAL CASES ON POSTHUMOUS REPUTATION AND 
PRIVACY 
History censorship has been conducted by state authority not only 
in totalitarian and authoritarian countries, but also in democracies. This 
is reflected in legal cases in which state authority tries to support 
official versions of history, and restrict its critics to protect public 
figures, in particular political leaders. The state has done this by 
passing special laws to prevent public scrutiny, by protecting religious 
identity by punishing certain expressions, and by refusing rehabilitation 
of victims of crimes against humanity for national pride, etc. 
Since it is impossible to discuss all the cases that have been 
collected by this research, this section will classify them into eight 
categories for analysis. It will try to explain the circumstances of such 
cases, including the disputed history at stake, complaints of plaintiffs, 
political-social settings, court rulings with regard to interference, etc. to 
check possible history censorship involved and the underlying 
reasoning. 
A. Posthumous Reputation and Collective Memory 
Posthumous reputation is an important element to national identity 
formation, national history, and collective memory. 115 This is the 
114. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance art. 24(1), Dec. 23, 2010, 2715 U.N.T.S (validated since Dec. 23, 2010, with 
92 signatories and 38 parties). 
115. Though history and collective memory are perceived differently by many 
historians. See GROSS, supra note 30, at 6- 9. 
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reason why many states demonstrate great interest in its protection. 
First of all, reputations of deceased heroes, heroines, or martyrs, who 
are regarded as icons of the national identities by their communities, are 
good targets for recounting the stories of history. 
In the Israeli case of Szenes, the deceased heroine is "one of the 
prominent icons of the Zionist narrative." 116 Fifty years after her brave 
death in 1944, Chana Szenes was ridiculed and defamed by the 
Broadcasting Authority and others posthumously in a fictional drama. 117 
The petitioners claimed the tale of Szenes' bravery belongs to the 
history of the Jewish nation and is part of national folklore, 118 
demanding protection of the dead's reputation for public interest. Chief 
Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court, on behalf of the majority, 
first explained the importance of posthumous reputation to the Israeli 
community, expressing that "the only asset of many people, both public 
servants and those working in the private sector, is their reputation, 
which they cherish as life itself. This applies to both the living and the 
dead."119 He further explained "[w]e must protect the dignity of the 
deceased and their good name."120 He recognized that the alleged 
paragraph "offended the memory of Chana Szenes[,] ... maligned her 
dignity and the myth surrounding her", and injured the feelings of the 
public in general and that of Holocaust survivors in particular, and also 
injured those who "cherish the memory" of the dead Szenes. 121 Also, 
Chief Justice Barak confirmed that the defamation of Szenes harmed 
national values 122 and the public interest for Israeli law to protect 
includes collective identity and national history. 123 
Justice Cheshin, in the dissenting opinion, clarified that human 
dignity and the right to liberty, the right to reputation and the right to 
freedom of expression are of equal legal status under the Israeli Basic 
Law. 124 He further stated that "human dignity includes a person's 
reputation", 125 while stressing the importance of Freedom of speech as 
116. Schejter, supra note 33, at 924. 
117. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority [1999] (Isr.). 
118. See id. para. 4. 
119. Id. para. 12. 
120. Id. 
121. See id. para. 12-14. 
122. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 12-14 [1999] (Isr.). 
123. See id. para. 13-14 ("Each state has its own collective identity; each state has its 
national history and its own social goals, the realization of which forms part of the public 
interest."). 
124. Id. para. 18, 21, 26 (Cheshin, J. dissenting). 
125. Id. para. 29 (Cheshin, J. dissenting). 
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one of the State of Israel's fundamental values as a democratic state. 126 
Cheshin ruled that "[ w ]e are dealing with a right of dimensions 
struggling against a smaller right. The dignity and reputation of Chana 
easily prevail over the rights of the playwright and the Broadcasting 
Authority." 127 However, the majority of the court disagreed that only a 
near certainty of grave and severe harm to public interest, the reputation 
and dignity of the deceased and public feelings, can warrant the court's 
intervention. 128 Since this is not the situation in the instant case, the 
majority refused to protect the dead's reputation, even noting the 
importance of the dead's reputation to Israeli collective memory. 129 
Justice M. Cheshin made an important distinction between persons 
and historical figures of the Israeli Deformation Law (1967) regarding 
protection of the diseased. 13° Cheshin explained that the law protects 
only the dead persons' reputations and dignity, not historical figures. 131 
Cheshin explained that persons are those dead who have relatives to sue 
for protection of their interests, namely heirs, family members and close 
relatives. 132 Another criterion to define a dead person is whether there 
are people alive who knew the dead personally; if there are persons still 
knowing him or her, the dead continues to be a person. 133 The two 
criteria can define the confine of the protection of posthumous 
reputation and dignity by the Israeli law. 
In contrast, following Justice Cheshin's distinction, Taiwanese 
courts went too far in 1976 to protect a Chinese poet's reputation, who 
died a thousand years ago. 134 The poet Han Yu holds an iconic status in 
Chinese classical literature and has been highly respected for his 
contribution to traditional Chinese culture. He was "defamed" by a 
historian in the latter's journal article that described the dead as a 
Lothario who died from abuse of poisonous chemicals. A distant 
descendent accused the author of libelling the dead and damaging the 
respect and memory of his ancestor. Both the trial court and the appeals 
126. See id para. 9. 
127. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 37 [1999] (Isr.) 
(Cheshin, J., dissenting). 
128. See id para. 20, 28, 34. 
129. See id para 24 (the court concluded: "However, a democratic society does not 
preserve the image of its heroes by repressing freedom of expression and artistic creation.). 
The legend must flow from free exchange of ideas and opinions. See also id para. 27. 
130. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting). 
131. Id 
132. HCJ 6143/94 Szenes etc. v. Broadcasting Authority para. 19, 24 [1999] (Isr.) 
(Cheshin, J., dissenting). 
133. Id para. 24 (Cheshin, J. dissenting). 
134. See YANG RENSHOU FAXUE FANGFA LUN 1-6 (1999). 
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court found the accused guilty, partially due to the reason that the 
defamation was a threat to the Chinese cultural identity. The 
posthumous protection has its deep origin in the long Chinese tradition 
to respect dead ancestors. 135 
After the death of many dictators and the collapse of their regimes, 
they have been re-evaluated by new communities with transformed 
morals and political ideologies. Their supporters have conflicted with 
dissenters over the problem of how to handle the memory and legacies 
of the deceased dictators. Many have lodged defamation cases in court. 
For instance, Franco, the deceased Spanish dictator, was recently 
mocked by an artist who put a sculpture of him in a refrigerator, 
indicating his still "being fresh" in modem Spain. 136 The artist was 
accused in 2012 by an organization called the Francisco Franco 
Foundation, claiming defamation of Franco and seeking 18,000 euros in 
damages. Supporters and opponents also bear different memories to the 
dead dictators and they have much departed views of the past. In such 
cases, judicial decisions are critical in confirming which view is 
justified before the public. 
Under many circumstances, historians' research and publication 
regarding the deceased' s reputation have challenged the memory and 
identity of local communities that have constructed a desired memory 
and identity by means of voluntary forgetting or hiding some dark past. 
When historian Anja Rosmus-Wenninger stood up to investigate what 
had happened to the Jews at her hometown Passau, Germany, she was 
shocked by her findings of the close cooperation of the locals with the 
Nazi regime. Instead, the local community, contrary to her findings, has 
proclaimed an identity of strong resistance against the Nazi policy. She 
discovered that two distinguished Paussau priests, whose names were 
under data protection, denounced Jews to the Gestapo in 1936, but one 
died with the reputation of a saint and the other as a resistant to the Nazi 
regime. The revelation of the facts led to the accusation of monstrous 
defamation by the locals. She was watched, molested and assaulted by 
her co-citizens. Though her victory in court helped her regain 
confidence in the German community, 137 she eventually migrated to the 
U.S. 
135. See XIAO ZESHENG MUDI SHANG DE XIANFA QUANLI 
PAXUE 70- 79 (2011). 
136. Guy Hedgecoe, Spanish Left Cold over "Franco in a Fridge", DW (Aug. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-l 7029255 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014)(the case was first rejected by a Spanish judge in July 2013 and 
now is pending on appeal). 
137. See COULMAS, supra note 48. 
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B. Political Figures and History Controversies 
As noted above, Anja Rosmus-Wenninger only conflicted with her 
local community. Reputations of dead political figures that bear more 
substantial connections with present politics will be under much closer 
watch by many, including the dead's families and their political allies, 
who are usually powerfully equipped with sufficient social resources to 
win defamation battles. 
In the French case of Editions Pion, the family of the dead French 
President Mitterrand accused his former private physician of breaching 
medical confidentiality, and therefore invading the privacy of the dead 
and his family, 138 degrading the deceased's reputation and honor. 139 In 
his book Le Grand Secret, which was published shortly after 
Mitterrand's death, Dr. Gubler wrote that the dead president had been 
diagnosed with cancer a few months after his first election, but he 
ordered concealment of his illness and issued false health bulletins. 140 
The French courts upheld the accusations and restricted the book's 
distribution with an interim injunction in the first instance. 141 The 
family also brought civil proceedings against Dr. Gubler and others, 
prohibiting the resumption of the book's publication, or deleting certain 
pages and paragraphs as altemative. 142 
The European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") found a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention in that the legal measures 
restricting the publication of the book were not appropriate to the ends 
of the French law in pursuit after balancing them with the author's free 
speech rights protected by Article 10. 143 The Court recognized the 
interim injunction as a justified legal measure to protect the plaintiffs' 
privacy. It is rather clear in this case that posthumous publication 
would have big influences on the late President's reputation and his 
family pride. But, the Court defined that the disclosure is of public 
interest, "in particular the public's right to be informed about any 
serious illnesses suffered by the head of State, and the question whether 
138. See Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014). A breach of confidentiality in France is a criminal offense under Article 226-13 of 
the Criminal Code. See also id. para. 3. 
139. Id. para. 34. 
140. Id. para. 6. 
141. Id. para. 12. 
142. Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00, para. 14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
143. Id. 
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a person who knew that he was seriously ill was fit to hold the highest 
national office."144 The information is important to transparency of 
government and there is no "pressing social need" to take the prescribed 
measures against the publishing company. 145 
In Mizzi v. Malta, the ECtHR quashed the judgements of Maltase 
courts, finding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 146 The Court 
did not directly reject the protection of the dead Prime Minister's 
reputation by the domestic courts. However, it argued that the 
protection is disproportionate, particularly in the view of the dead as a 
former politician and a public figure, who should be subject to wider 
limits of acceptable criticisms and that the disputed article covered a 
subject of public interest. 147 
In the Spanish case Rosa MariaL6pe & Gutierrez, the author and 
editor of a newspaper were accused of violating the right of honor of the 
Moroccan King Hassan II due to their report of a drug trafficking issue, 
of which the ECtHR found the Spanish state violated the free speech 
rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
("Convention"). 148 The Spanish courts took measures to restrict the 
publication of the newspaper article that reported the suspicious 
connection of the then-living King to a drug smuggling caught by 
Spanish police. 149 The Court quashed the domestic decisions and ruled 
that the measures taken by the Spanish authority cannot be proved that 
the interference claimed was "necessary in a democratic society" and 
could not meet "a pressing social need"; it simply did not find that the 
144. Id. para. 44. 
145. Id. 
146. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-107530 (last visited Dec. 
4, 2014). 
147. Id. para. 38; see also Lombardo v. Malta, App. No. 7333/06, (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 
27, 2007), available at http://www.pfcmalta.org/uploads/l/2/l/7/12174934/7333-06.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a 
politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former Correct 
inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their words and deeds by 
journalists and the public at large, and they must consequently display a greater degree of 
tolerance"). 
148. The monarch filed the case himself but later died during domestic proceeding. 
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012). Hereinafter, the 
English version of the verdict will be referenced. Victory of Spanish Journalist at European 
Court Is Final, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM COMM., Nov. 30, 2010, available at: 
http://www.wpfc.org/?q=node/447 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
149. The alleged article mentioned similar reports that were also published in El 
Mundo, Le Monde, and Herald Tribune, which stated that drug trafficking was the main 
source of foreign currency for Morocco and pointed to some Moroccan politicians close to 
the king. Id. para. 6. 
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information disclosed was capable of causing injury to the personal 
reputation of the king. 150 The Court prescribed that while journalist 
reports can be presented in different ways, "it is not for the Court of 
Justice or for the national jurisdictional authorities to otherwise replace 
the press to say what technique must the journalists adopt." 151 
The author and editor involved in the Spanish case above are not 
the only authors and journalists who were punished for defaming 
deceased kings and their families. In 2007, Swiss citizen Oliver Jufer 
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Thailand for insulting King 
Bhumibol Adulyadej by vandalising portraits of the monarch with black 
spray-paint during a drunken spree. 152 Citizens of democracies might 
have problems with the rationales to protect dead kings and state heads, 
as discussion of their past activities is of public interest and important 
for public discourse of state policy. Political figures of high status, such 
as state heads, are obviously important historical figures ( or persons in 
the Israeli term), and shall be under public scrutiny. When defamation 
cases concern public figures, the truth that the defendants claimed to 
have spoken is relevant to the narration of public history. 153 
As indicated above, re-assessment of the dead's reputation can 
modify our view of the past and collective memory. In Lehideux & 
lsorni v. France, 154 the French judicial authority convicted the authors 
of an advertisement published in Le Monde. The text was read as 
defending the memory of Marshal Petain, the famous collaborator of the 
Nazi Party who was responsible for the death of many French Jews in 
Nazi concentration camps. The ECtHR overruled the French decisions 
and found the criminal conviction unnecessary in a democratic 
society. 155 It made an important distinction between clearly established 
historical facts, such as genocide and Holocaust, and historical facts that 
are not clearly established, as in the instant case. 156 As a leading case, 
the Court set out the rule that denial of the Holocaust and atrocities 
150. Id. para. 36. 
151. Id. para. 33 (reiterating its previous ruling in Bladet & Stensaas v. Norway [GC], 
App. No. 21980/93, para. 63 (E. Ct. H.R. 1999)). 
152. World Briefing I Asia: Thailand: Man Who Insulted King Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9 AOOE4D9 l 33FF930A25757COA96 l 9C8B63&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3 As 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
153. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing that defamation cases in which the 
defendant claims to have spoken the truth, may sometimes be the background for judgments 
of historical significance). 
154. Lehideuz & Isomi v. France, App. No. 55/1997/839/1045, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1998). 
155. Id. para. 58. 
156. Id. para. 47. 
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should be excluded from protection of Article 10 of the Convention. 157 
By denying protection of revisionists and Holocaust deniers, the 
Court has obviously promoted a judicial narrative and forbids further 
challenges, which leads to a further question of the proper roles of court 
in general. Many have doubted the roles of courts in handling cases 
regarding historical controversies, questioning if courts are the right 
locus to address historical events. As Barak-Erez noted, courts may 
choose three roles to play: as judges and arbiters of historical events; as 
narrators of history; and as students and teachers of historical lesson. 158 
In my view, courts of law can nevertheless avoid to play such roles 
either singly or simultaneously in handling defamation cases regarding 
historical events, though their capacities are under doubt. 
We observe a similar role played by a Japanese court to affirm the 
official narrative, like the ECtHR, in reaffirming Japan's dark past 
during the WWII. Shortly before the notorious Nanjing massacre, two 
Japanese officers participated in a killing contest with swords to prove 
their military bravery or brutality. Both were executed after the war in 
Nanjing for their committed war crimes by the Nanjing War Crimes 
Tribunal. The story was reported in 1971 by two Japanese newspapers, 
Mainichi Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun. The dead's families sued for 
posthumous defamation, claiming fabrication of the story. 159 The 
Japanese court rejected their claims and confirmed the trueness of the 
reports, despite some minor mistakes. The case concerns Japan's war 
crimes in China that are well-established historical facts and unable to 
be overturned in the defamation case. 
It is no doubt that the dead's families are the strongest defenders of 
their reputation since they are directly impacted in their daily life. 
Negative reputation of the dead will have passive influence on the 
living's life and repute. In the French case, Fondation Franco-
Japonaise dite Sasakawa vs. Karoline Postel-Vinay,160 Sasakawa 
Franco-Japanese Foundation accused French historian Karoline Postel-
157. Id. (prescribing that denial or revision of "clearly established historical facts -
such as the Holocaust - ... would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 
17."). 
158. Barak-Erez, supra, note 29, at 91-100. 
159. Mainichi Shimbun and another newspaper Asahi Shimbun. Suit Denying Pair 's 
Wartime Beheading Spree Fails, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE (Aug. 24, 2005), available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/08/24/national/suit-denying-pairs-wartime-
beheading-spree-fails/#.Uee836xoVtO (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
160. Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ ordinary court oforiginal jurisdiction] Paris, 
Sept. 22, 2010 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.concemedhistorians.org/content_ files/file/LE/l 84.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
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Vinay for slurring on its respectability. Postel-Vinay sent an e-mail to 
participants of a symposium held on the big social event of the 150th 
anniversary of the diplomatic relations between Japan and France, of 
which the Foundation was a sponsor. The controversial e-mail was 
entitled "Sasakawa, a war criminal to celebrate 150 years of Franco-
Japanese Diplomacy?" 161 The author explained that together with other 
sixteen historians and academics, she felt it was "quite inappropriate 
that a foundation fashioning its own name after that of a class A war 
criminal should sponsor such a gathering." 162 The Paris District Court 
found part of the e-mail text libellous, but dismissed the case due to a 
successful defense of good faith by the author. 163 
C. Rehabilitation and Posthumous Justice 
As noted above, the Japanese court rejected the defamatory 
accusation of the journalists and affirmed the war crimes of the two 
executed military officers. However, Japanese courts have been very 
reluctant to deliver judgments in favor of the victims of Chinese 
comfort women, as some survivors have sued for remedies of past 
suffering. 164 In a collective sense, whether victims of war crimes, 
atrocities and the Holocaust are recognized by their victim status and 
offered proper compensations is important not only as a matter of 
justice, but also as a matter of human dignity and respect. The living 
victims should not be hurt a second time and those dead should not have 
their names lost in the dust of history. This is especially true for the 
dead victims of war atrocities during the Second World War, either 
conducted by Nazi Germany or by the former Soviet Union. 
The Katyn tragedy shocked the world by the annihilation of almost 
a whole generation of Polish elites by the Russian military after its 
invasion. The tragedy left a deep wound in Polish people and human 
history. It is after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the truth came 
out. On November 26, 2010, the Russian State Duma issued a formal 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 3. 
163. Id. 
164. After 1996 such victims are defined by United Nations as forced slaves. Many 
Korean victims acquired remedies and formal apology from the Japanese government. See 
Japan Court Backs 3 Brothel Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/l 998/04/28/world/japan-court-backs-3-brothel-
victims.html?src=pm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). However, the law suits lodged by Chinese 
victims ended only with recognition of the historical tragedy, but without any compensation 
since, among other justifications, the Japanese Supreme Court deferred to a 1972 bilateral 
treaty signed by the Chinese Communist government to abandon war compensation. PEIPEI 
QIU, supra note 45, at 175. 
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statement on the tragedy, declaring that "[i]t is necessary to continue 
studying the archives, verifying the lists of victims, restoring the good 
names of those who perished in Katyn and other places and uncovering 
the circumstances of the tragedy." 165 However, when some surviving 
family members of the deceased victims tried to seek the whereabouts 
of their beloved, time and again they were confronted with obstacles 
from the present Russian authorities. They were refused further help 
and serious replies from the Russian authorities, 166 and an official 
investigation ended prematurely and the related documents were 
classified afterwards. The case finally ended up in ECtHR to which the 
Russian state authorities still refused to provide key documents relating 
to the case upon the Court's request. The Chamber first found 
violations of some applicants' rights not to be subjected to inhumane or 
degrading treatment protected under Article 3 of the Convention, as 
well as a violation of Article 38 of the Convention. 167 The Chamber 
commented that the Court "is struck by the apparent reluctance of the 
Russian authorities to recognize the reality of the Katyn massacre" 
noting the fact that after the discontinuation of the investigation, "the 
Russian prosecutors consistently rejected the applicants' requests for 
rehabilitation of their relatives." 168 The Grand Chamber upheld the 
Chamber decision on a violation of Article 38, but overruled its decision 
of an Article 3 violation by the Russian State authorities. 169 
It seems that requesting rehabilitation from a foreign state is not 
easy for many reasons. Rehabilitation of dead victims consequent to 
communist political convictions was not an easy thing either even in 
their motherlands. In Kurzac v. Poland, a Polish-American tried to 
rehabilitate his deceased brother - a victim of the Polish Communist 
suppression - and to restore his own family's reputation. 170 However, 
the legal procedures had lasted for five years and were unbearable to the 
applicant, so that the case was eventually brought to ECtHR for a 
violation of Article 6-1 (hearing within a reasonable time). 171 In the 
admissibility judgment, the ECtHR decided that "the result of the 
165. See Janowiec v. Russia, App. nos. 55508/07 & 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-127684 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
166. See id para. 39. 
167. See generally id 
168. Id. para. 45-46. 
169. Id. para. 50. 
170. Kurzac v. Poland, App. No. 31382/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
171. Id para. 1. In this case, the Court considered the possibility of extending its 
jurisdiction to cases of atrocity that happened more than half a century ago. 
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proceedings in issue was decisive for rights which by their very nature 
were civil, namely, the applicant's right to enjoy a good reputation and 
his right to protect the honour of his family and restore its good 
name." 172 The Court therefore puts the reputation of a surviving family 
under its consideration in the case of rehabilitation of dead victims. 
In Spain, the 1977 Amnesty Law has blocked the road both to 
rehabilitate the deceased victims of the brutal Civil War and long 
dictatorship, and to condemn the responsible perpetrators, whether dead 
or alive. The law has been passed consequent to a compromise made 
among different social forces to facilitate the democratic transition. 173 
But the amnesty law was defined by the UN as incompatible with the 
International Human Rights law with respect to crimes against humanity 
that should enjoy no statute oflimitations. 174 
A Spanish judge's effort to apply such international human rights 
law was impeded when the Spanish Amnesty Law was under scrutiny. 
Judge Garzon issued the historical arrest warrant of former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet and contributed to legal proceedings against 
the perpetrator. 175 He also tried to apply the same standard to Spain's 
historical crimes, when some family members of the missing asked the 
Audiencia Nacional (National Court) to investigate the whereabouts of 
their remains for a decent burial. 176 Garzon conferred his jurisdiction to 
the local courts to answer such inquiries. 177 But this caused chaos and 
he was accused of flouting the Amnesty Law and committing the crime 
of prevaricaci6n. 178 He was eventually exonerated by the Spanish 
Supreme Court, but the decision ended the legal approach of Civil War 
172. Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 31382/96, para. 6 (Eur. Ct. 
R.R. May 25, 2000), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ sites/ eng/pages/ search.aspx?i=OO 1-5 297 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
173. Or the pact of oblivion (el pacto de olvido). See Teresa Fernandez Paredes, 
Transitional Justice in Democratization Processes: the Case of Spain from an International 
Point of View, 1 INT'L J. RULE L., TRANSITIONAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. 124, 125 (2010); 
Sumalla, supra note 52, at 733- 37. This law was counter-balanced recently by a new 
Historical Memory Law in Spain (Ley de la memoria historica). See Sumalla, supra note 
52, at 737-43. 
174. See the relative comment from the UN Human Rights Office. See Spain Must 
Lift Amnesty for Franco Era Crimes-U.N, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Feb. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.trust.org/item/?map=spain-must-lift-amnesty-for-franco-era-crimes-
un (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
175. Naomi Robt-Arriaza, The Spanish Civil War, Amnesty, and the Trials of Judge 
Garzon, 16 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. (July 25 , 2012), available at 
http://www.asi l .org/insights/volume/ 16/issue/24/spanish-civil-war-amnesty-and-trials-
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Era claims. 179 This reaction indicates the difficulties in the 
implementation of the 2007 Law of Historical Memory, which 
addresses the need to honor the victims of the Civil War and Franco 
dictatorship and to provide them with reparation. 180 
What the living sought for the deceased are posthumous dignity 
and justice in the sense that they should have not been wronged. The 
deceased victims' names should be cleaned of political smears. The 
deceased should not die with wrongly charged crimes. In this sense, 
rehabilitation of the deceased victims relates more to the concept of 
justice, or historical justice, and historical truth or correct historical 
narrative. 181 Even deceased victims have the moral rights to truth, 
justice and reparation in a fair community and this explains why the 
British Government recently decided that the army should not have 
executed soldiers for cowardice in WWI and posthumously pardoned 
the deceased. 182 Similarly, the Americans have apologized for the 
mistreatments of Japanese migrants during WWII and of indigenous 
Indians for past injustice. 183 
Lastly, one must note that the rehabilitation of the dead victims in 
the above cases is possible because of changed social morals or ethos 
consequent to political changes or the advancement of humanity. This 
will be discussed further in Section VI, which illustrates how political 
change and cultural shift have influenced posthumous reputation and 
our understandings of the past. 
D. Posthumous Privacy and Individual Dignity 
The dead may be no more, but their past deeds are kept among the 
memories of those who know them in person or who have heard of 
them, or who read their diaries, letters or memoranda. More 
importantly, their images and likeness, as a crucial part of their past 
existence and the living's impression, can be kept in various forms such 
as photographs, newspapers, archival documents, films, or most 
recently, in digital forms on the Internet. In particular, their names and 
voices can be used commercially; their images and likeness may be 
179. Id. 
180. See Sumalla, supra note 52, at 743-44. 
181. In this regard, reparation of injustice, according to the United Nations, includes 
five forms, namely: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-repetition, 
and satisfaction. Satisfaction includes symbolic reparation or posthumous rehabilitation. See 
G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112 at para. 22(d). 
182. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 28. 
183. See generally Janna Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying 
Claims of Descendants, 112 ETHICS 114 (2001). 
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exhibited in history museums for public knowledge; or statues and 
monuments may be erected to keep their memory alive in community 
life; or foundations, cities and streets may be named after the deceased 
for their remembrance or collective memory. 
In many occasions, such uses may cause conflicts with their 
surviving family's interest as well as the dead's privacy and reputation 
( or in abstract, dignity). For instance, the likeness could be used in a 
defamatory way, or the dead's families are not willing to disclose such 
materials to the public, whether for commercial use or for public 
knowledge; or they are reluctant for such disclosure because the end 
products are not in favor of the dead. The most extremist version of this 
category of "defamation" is the defamatory treatment of the likeness of 
political figures to present political opinions. When the deceased are 
treated as the icons or pride of a national state and under protection, 
such "mistreatment" can be handled seriously. 
During the 1989 Beijing Student Protest in June, to advocate their 
anti-dictatorship opinion, three young Chinese threw ink-filled eggs to 
deface the great portrait of Mao hung on the Tian'an Gate overseeing 
the Tiananmen Square. They were caught and sentenced to long-term 
imprisonments for crimes of anti-revolution and defamation of the 
founder of the communist state. 184 We can find a similar situation in 
Turkey where acts against the late Ataturk were punished by Law No. 
5816 with harsh imprisonment. 185 Many journalists and historians have 
been accused of defamation of Ataturk in the past under this special 
legislation, which has been criticized by international society. 186 
184. Mao was and still is the icon and pride of the national state to many Chinese 
today. The three convicts got, respectively, sixteen, twenty and life imprisonment. China Is 
Accused of Torturing 3 Who Defaced Mao Portrait, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1992), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/01 /world/china-is-accused-of-torturing-3-who-defaced-
mao-portrait.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Mao Portrait Protesters Reunited, RADIO FREE 
ASIA (June 21, 2010), available at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/portrait-
062 l 2010110340.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
185. McCRACKEN, supra note 55, at 31. 
186. See Prosecutor Investigates A TV Show For Defamation Of Ataturk, BIANET (June 
13, 2008, 11 :30 AM), available at http://www.bianet.org/english/religion/107620-
prosecutor-investigates-a-tv-show-for-defamation-of-ataturk (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 
Julia Wetherell, EU Fines Turkey for Blocking Google Sites, TECHPRESIDENT (Dec. 19, 
2012), available at http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/23289/eu-fines-turkey-blocking-
google-sites (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Nagehan Alci, Journalist to Sue for Defamation 
After Ataturk Remarks, TODAY'S ZAMAN (Nov. 11, 2011, 5:30 PM), available at 
http://www.todayszaman.com//news-262347-joumalist-to-sue-for-defamation-after-ataturk-
remarks.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). For a more detailed discussion, see Antoon De 
Baets, Defamation Cases Against Historians, 41 HIST. & THEORY 346, 349 
(2002)(particularly note 12). 
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The likeness of the dead can be well protected by law in Western 
democracies under privacy law, especially when the proprietary 
interests of the dead's likeness and name are of concern. In the U.S., 
the dead's images or likeness could be protected indirectly, as surviving 
families claim invasions of their own privacy or reputation against 
disclosure or appropriation. Journalist Allen Favish was denied access 
to posthumous photographs taken of the late Vincent Foster at the death 
scene and during the autopsy. 187 Foster was a high-ranking White 
House lawyer involved in the investigation of Clinton family's scandal 
of Whitewater Real Estate Venture. He was found to have committed 
suicide following the official investigation. Favish suspected that the 
denial to the requested photos of the deceased was part of a cover-up of 
the murder. The U.S. government refused his request on the ground of 
protection of the privacy of Foster's family. They explained that 
disclosure of such photographs would traumatize the family and invade 
their privacy. The Supreme Court of the U.S. ruled that the privacy 
interests of the family trump the public's interest in seeing the pictures 
of his death scene. 188 
But, the dead's privacy and reputation were not without 
consideration of the Chief Justice. In Swidler & Berlin v. United 
States, 189 Justice William Rehnquist, on behalf of the majority, 
concluded that to assume a dead person's interest in reputation ends 
upon his death is unreasonable, which the dissenting Justice Sandra 
O'Connor also agreed on. 190 In MacDonald v. Time, District Judge 
Sarokin said that such an idea, that a man's defamed reputation dies 
with him, is to ignore the realities of life and the bleak legacy which he 
leaves behind. 191 
Many European jurisdictions offer direct protection by statutory 
law. Appropriation of the dead's likeness as invasion of posthumous 
privacy is forbidden in Italy. The Italian magazine Chi purchased the 
exclusive right to publish the pictures taken shortly after Princess 
187. See generally Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
188. See id. at 170-72. 
189. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998); see also Raymond 
Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause of Action for 
Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statues, 9 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition for decedents' 
reputation). 
190. See generally Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 411 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) 
(agreeing that normally the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client). 
191. MacDonald v. Time, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Why should a 
claim for a damaged leg survive one's death, where a claim for a damaged name does not. 
After death, the leg cannot be healed, but the reputation can."). 
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Diana's fatal accident and obtained the findings of the autopsy. The 
Italian court regarded it as a violation of the dead's dignity and found 
that the disclosure was not justified by the need of free information of 
the public. 192 Further dissemination of such information may face 
criminal punishments, such as imprisonment for up to two years. 193 
According to Madoff, after the death of Saddam Hussein, even the 
Italian special authority gave a press release to caution the media to 
respect the dead's dignity. 194 
Protection of the deceased's last dignity, in particular their death 
scene pictures, has been recognized by other EU countries. In Hachette 
Filipacchi Associes v. France, the dead's widow and children accused 
several companies of an infringement of the right to respect of their 
private life after the companies disclosed a photograph of the murdered 
Prefect Claude Brignac in Ajaccio for commercial use. The photograph 
was supplementary to an article and displayed his dead body lying on 
the ground. 195 The French Court of Cassation concluded that because 
the photograph clearly indicated the body and face of the murdered, the 
publication showed disregard for human dignity and therefore the 
publication was illegal. 196 In replying to the ECtHR, the French 
Government explicitly expressed that though the publication of that 
article concerned a matter of public interest, it affected the dignity of a 
civil servant, which is part of "the hard core" of his rights, as well as the 
private life of his family. 197 
In the Slovak Republic, courts judged in similar ways to protect the 
privacy of the dead and their family. For example, in Weiss vs. R., a. s., 
several photographs of a mother's dead body and others ante mortem 
were published, together with some excerpts of her suicide letter. The 
deceased was Ms. Marcela Weissova, wife of Slovak politician Mr. 
Peter Weiss. Her son accused the publisher of violating his own and his 
late mother's personality rights. The Slovakia judiciary authorities 
acknowledged that the publication of photographs of the dead body 
violated Article 15 CC of the Civil Code, which protects posthumous 
192. MADOFF, supra note 28, at 128. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. See Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, App. No. 71111/01, para. 7-11 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. June 14, 2007), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=OOl-81066 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
196. Id. para. 19. 
197. Id. para. 11 (finding no violation of free speech rights of the applicant company 
under Article 10 of the Convention). 
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personality rights and therefore ordered remedies. 198 
Not only is dignity of the dead under legal protection when the 
dead's likeness is in controversy, but also when the related economic 
benefits are of much closer concern of the living families. This 
concerns the economic perspective of the dead's name, likeness, etc. 
Again, Princess Diana would be bothered if she had the chance to know 
the fierce legal battles fought under the name of her remembrance, of 
which millions of dollars were at stake. 199 A similar story happened to 
Martin Luther King, whose family charged heavily on the use of his 
likeness, name and the famous "I have a dream" speech. 200 
German law, as Rosler suggested, differentiated more clearly 
between protection of reputation and privacy as dignity and as property 
in particular in the 1999 Marlene Dietrich Decision. 201 It is the first 
time that the German Federal Court rendered damages to posthumous 
invasion of personality on the ground of commercial exploitation of the 
decedent's name, voice or image, which was part of marketing strategy 
about Marlene Dietrich. This involved various products such as bags, t-
shirts, watches, calling cards, pins, etc. The Constitutional Court of 
Germany upheld the decision and affirmed the inclusion of commercial 
aspects of personality rights under constitutional protection. 202 
E. Biography Writing and Posthumous Disputes 
Biography writing matters not only to the living, but also to the 
dead because this is an important means to recount their life and 
198. The Constitutional Court upheld the decision with a monetary compensation for 
the invasion of the deceased mother's privacy Weiss vs. R., a. s., 7.07.2009 (US), III. US 
185/09-24 (Slovak Republic) (the case is briefed to the author by his student research 
assistant, Mr. Martin Duchac ). 
199. See Matthew Magee, Court Rules that Newspaper does not have to Identify 
Commenters, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:54 PM), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/01 /sue-commenters-libel-daily-mail (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014); Heather Timmons, Diana Charity Halts Grants, Citing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 12, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07 /12/world/diana-charity-halts-
grants-citing-lawsuit.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); Marius Meland, Princess Diana Fund, 
Franklin Mint Settle Trademark Dispute, LAw360 (Nov. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/2540/princess-diana-fund-franklin-mint-settle-trademark-
dispute (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
200. Jonathan Turley, Cashing in on Martin Luther King Jr., Los ANGELES TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/22/opinion/oe-turley22 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (King's family winning landmark case against USA Today and 
CBS for the illegal use of King's speech without paying them); see also MADOFF supra note 
28, at 9-10. 
201. Rosler, supra note 77, at 181. 
202. Id. 
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achievement. As Craik pointed out, many dead even got more famous 
after their death through successful biographies. 203 Some people will 
get their autobiographies ready before death to prevent defamatory 
statements; others may hire professional writers to put down their 
stories before death, 204 as Apple's founder Steven Jobs made such an 
arrangement with the author of his biography. 205 After death, living 
families may also hire professional writers to complete the story of the 
deceased for many reasons. Or, biographies of the dead could be 
written by many without the consent of the dead before death and of 
their families after death. These two circumstances can both lead to 
controversies. 
The Canadian case Turgeon v. Michaud lasted for seven years 
because of the vague assignment of the author's rights upon writing a 
biography for a famous Quebec businessman. The dead' s family 
commissioned author Pierre Turgeon to write Desrosier's biography in 
order to promote business by telling the stories of the founder and how 
he managed to establish a commercially successful enterprise. 206 The 
timeline set out in the initial agreement was not respected and the 
writing was delayed several times. At last the author's manuscript was 
not to the heirs' satisfaction, who decided not to publish it. 
Nevertheless, the author sought to publish the draft at another 
publishing company other than the agreed one. The Quebec Superior 
Court issued a permanent injunction against Turgeon, halting him from 
publishing the manuscript. The trial judge claimed that the deceased's 
heir had the right to refuse to publish the manuscript and the author 
could not publish any content that is based on the confidential 
information provided by the deceased's family. 207 
Biographers are likely to disclose private matters that others would 
have no chance to know. This influences the deceased's' reputations as 
203. CRAIK, supra note 10, at 182-86 (arguing that biography may extend a dead's 
reputational network and biographical reputational network ultimately serves as the major 
locus of the posthumous reputational network). 
204. Id. at 190 (an example of "pre-posthumous tasks" is Thomas Hardy, who spent 
years ghostwriting his official biography and then covered it as his wife's memoir). 
205. With an agreement that Jobs would not interfere with the contents of his own 
biography. Nick Bilton, One on One: Walter Isaacson, Biographer of Steve Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES: BITS BLOG (Nov. 18, 2011, 9:41 AM), available at 
http:/ /bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011 /1 l /18/one-on-one-walter-isaacson-biographer-of-steve-
jobs/? _r=O (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
206. Alexandra Steele, Once Upon a Time, There was a Manuscript, CETNRE CDP 
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well as their families' reputations. Francis Russell, an American writer 
and biographer, was confronted by the heirs of ex-president Harding 
who sought injunction from Ohio court to exclude the use of love letters 
of the dead in his book The Shadow of Blowing Grave regarding 
Harding. These love letters were from Mrs. Phillips who had had an 
affair with Harding for more than fifteen years and was persuaded by 
Russell to relent. These letters were confiscated by an Ohio Court and 
they remained under a protective order until 2014.208 They cover the 
controversial period regarding Harding's nomination for the Republican 
presidency in 1920, when it was too late to change the nominee upon 
knowledge of the affair by the Republican Party, which sought ways to 
cover the affair. 209 The author protested by leaving the spaces for the 
citations from the letters merely blank in his published book.210 Yet 
during Harding's full term, voters never knew anything about his 
extramarital affairs, though he suffered multiple posthumous 
indignities. 211 
The above two cases show the importance of using unpublished 
materials in biographical writings and the big impacts of legal 
interferences on historical studies under copyrights. 212 Still, if a 
biography is not written in favor of the dead, their families may seek 
damages, injunctions, remedies and an obligatory formal apology to 
protect themselves and the dead. In China, the children of the deceased 
ex-prime minister Cheng Y onggui sued historian Wu Shi and won the 
case with remedies of emotional distress and a formal apology from the 
author and publisher.213 Wu described the deceased as "the peasant of 
Chairman Mao" and listed his previous deeds unknown to the public in 
208. Francis Russell, A Naughty President, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (1982), 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/l 982/jun/24/a-naughty-president/ 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
209. John H. Summers, What Happened to Sex Scandals? Politics and Peccadilloes, 
Jefferson to Kennedy, 87 J. AM. HIST. 825, 836 (2000). 
210. The letters are confiscated under the protection of common law copyright 
interests of the heirs. See John Dean, The Harding Affair: Evidence or Racism Rising, 
FINDLAW (Sept. 18, 2009), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20090918.html 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (detailing the story regarding Harding in his interview). 
211. Summers, supra note 210, at 836. 
212. For a general discussion regarding unpublished expressions in biographical 
writing without consent of the copyright holders in the United Stated, see Bilder, supra note 
37. 
213. Chen Mingliangyu Beijing qingnianbao he Wu Shi QianfanMingyuquan An 
[Chen Mingliang V. Wu Shi & Beijing Youth 
Newspaper] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. Ct. Dec. 29, 2003) (China), available at 
http://www.qinquan.info/138v9.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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a biography.214 Chen's living family would not accept such a negative 
account of the former politician with a good repute. Even if true, such 
writing denigrates the reputation of the dead. The adjudicating court 
ruled that the author used sources, such as private memos, personal 
interviews, etc., which are not official and un-authoritative.215 Although 
the author had been cautious and acted with due care in selecting 
materials and writing, the Chinese courts still demanded the use of 
certain sources and materials in favor of the deceased. 216 
Closely related to biographical writing are novels or fictions that 
are based on real stories of the deceased, but taken as defamatory 
against the deceased by their families. Such writings and narratives 
attract disputes from the dead's families or even agitate them because 
many audiences know clearly whom those characters are in real life. In 
a famous German case regarding the Klaus Mann's novel Mephisto-
Novel of a Career, Mann portrayed a character attributed to the well-
known, controversial German actor and theatre director Gustaf 
Griindgens (1899-1963).217 The heir of Griindgens filed a defamation 
suit and the German Constitutional Court judged in favor of the dead, 
finding that the defamation overrided constitutional values.218 The 
problem of such artistic works lies in the blurs of facts and imaginations 
that may mislead the audience to mistake fictions as reality of the 
past. 219 
No wonder Rosier questioned: "what would happen if such a 
fusion of fiction and fact took place on a large scale, changing even the 
perception of history"?220 This is the rationale behind the Brazilian 
Civil Code, which requires works of a biographical nature to have 
consent from their subjects before public release. This obviously 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. In another case, a young Chinese biographer, based on accessible university 
archives, depicted some notorious acts of a famous scholar, the former president of that 
university, during China's Culture Revolution. The presiding judge in this case explicitly 
expressed that memos included in such archives putting down people's self-and-mutual 
criticisms shall not be used for historical studies like author's work. Feng Boqun 
Yinyong Dangan Rechu de Yichang Guansi 3 DANGAN 
CHUNQIU 10- 15 (2006). 
217. Rosler,supranote 114,at 154-55, 174-78. 
218. Id. at 155. 
219. Take the Oscar-winning film Braveheart for example, which has been criticized 
by many historians of its inaccurate narrative. See Elizabeth Ewan, Braveheart.; Roy Roy, 4 
AM. HIST. REV. 1219, 1219-21 (1995), available at http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/ 
burt/Medieval%20cinema%20recommended/ AHR %20Braveheart. pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
220. Rosier, supra note 114, at 156. 
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influences contents of biographical works so that they "end up being 
eulogistic to the people they portray."221 For instance, Ruy Castro was 
accused by the relatives of the late footballer, World Cup champion 
Garrincha, of libel for his description of the deceased' s penis length. 222 
Defamation suits are a big threat to journalists and biographers who are 
willing to reveal the secrets and realities of the deceased that were once 
hidden for various reasons. 
If biographers are restricted in their writings in using unpublished 
expressions, then the value of biographical writings - in particular in 
view of their contribution to history - is shaky on the whole. 
F. Religious Honor and Group Identity 
With respect to defamation of religion, many will recall the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten that printed cartoons portraying Muhammad 
in a less favorable way. The case was defeated by the Danish court, 223 
although publishers of the same cartoon were punished in Jordan, 
Indonesia and Belarus224 which shows a different tolerance of free 
speech. The recent example is an Egyptian Christian teacher who was 
accused of defamation of Mohammed and Islam by her students and 
their parents.225 She was eventually removed from her job. No doubt, 
defamation of the dead prophet and religious leaders is somehow 
defamation of the accusers' religious identity, and therefore themselves. 
In jurisdictions where defamation of religion is punished, historians 
have been silenced and journalists have to conduct self-censorship to 
221. Rafael Spuldar, New Law Set to Ease the Way for Biographies in Brazil, XINDEX 
(May 9, 2013), available at http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/05/new-law-set-to-
ease-the-way-for-biographies-in-brazil/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
222. ALEX BELLOS, FUTEBOL: THE BRAZILIAN WAY OF LIFE 105 (Bloombury Publ'g 
Pie. 2009) (ironically, it was regarded by the adjudicating judge not as degrading, but as a 
pride of most Brazilians in that country). 
223. AFP, Muslim Cartoon Case Fails to Reach Denmark's Top Court, CANADA.COM 
(Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.canada.com/topics/ 
news/world/story.html?id=c25b9b8a-2906-453f-a67 l-l a4a 13 7fe6 l f (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
224. Meagan McElroy, Denmark Court Dismissed Lawsuit Against Editors over 
Muhammad Cartoons, JURIST (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:00 AM), available at 
http://jurist.org/thisday/2011 I I 0/danish-court-dismissed-lawsuit-against-editors-over-
muhammad-cartoons.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); see also L. Bennett Graham, 
Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 69, 69-73 (2009); 
see also Belnap, supra note 49, at 638-42. 
225. Pamela Geller, Sharia in Action: Christian Teacher in Egypt Accused of 
'Defaming Islam' Goes on Hunger Strike, ATLAS SHRUGS (May 13, 2013, 8:43 AM), 
available at http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas _ shrugs/2013/05/sharia-in-action-
christian-teacher-in-egypt-accused-of-defaming-islam-goes-on-hunger-strike.html (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
44
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4
2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy 83 
avoid troubles. 226 Such official reaction can even influence publishers 
from Western democracies who have to take into account negative 
consequences. For instance, a student editor from University of Illinois 
and an author from Cambridge University confronted aftereffects of 
their reproduction of the famous cartoon against Muhammad, 
implicating potential self-censorship by both university authorities. 227 
We shall not be surprised to observe similar cases even in 
European democracies that should have been more tolerant to extreme 
speeches. These cases usually stir up agitation and sentimental distress 
within religious communities. In the controversial Giniewski v. France, 
the author published an article in a Paris newspaper that was deemed 
racially defamatory against the Christian community. 228 The author 
was accused for condemning Christianity's historical anti-Semitism 
while claiming a direct :relation to the horrors at Auschwitz with the 
core doctrines of Catholic faith, which undermines "the honour and 
character of Christians and, more specifically, the Catholic 
community."229 In the subsequent legal proceedings, the criminal 
charge was dropped, but the civil complaint was upheld with remedies 
awarded and a public statement of court ruling ordered. 230 
The case went to the ECtHR for breaching the author's free speech 
rights. The applicant claimed that his speech was subject to stricter 
control regarding a sensitive religious matter and the French judicial 
interpretation of his article was not in accordance with the original texts, 
whose intention was to contribute to the public debate on the origins of 
anti-Semitism and the extermination of the Jews. 231 The ECtHR 
admitted that the interference was prescribed by law, and followed a 
legitimate aim to protect the reputation of others ( the Christian 
community at stake).232 The Court realized the fact of the broadened 
margin of appreciation of its contracting states, due to the "absence of a 
uniform European conception of the requirements of the protection of 
226. See Graham, supra note 225; see also ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-
OPERATION IN EUROPE, ENDING THE CHILLING EFFECT: WORKING TO REAL CRIMINAL LIBEL 
AND INSULT LA ws 97 (2004) (in many Eastern Europe and Central Asia countries, journalists 
are actively convicted and prosecuted by state authorities to encourage self-censorship). 
227. IVAN HARE & JAMES WEINSTEIN, EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 312 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2010). 
228. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, para. 14 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 31, 2006), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-72216 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
229. Id. para. 15. 
230. Id. para. 18-23. 
231. Id. para. 27-28. 
232. Id. para. 38-42. 
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the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious 
convictions. "233 It admitted that a proper decision was within its 
jurisdiction to decide on the pressing social need and proportionality of 
interference in balancing different interests. 234 
The Court concluded that the defamation accusation is ill grounded 
on the texts of the article. It held that the author made a contribution to 
the debate of a particular doctrine, which is open to further discussion 
by others. 235 The Court could not find attacks on religious beliefs even 
though it involved a religious doctrine and the gravity of the matter such 
as the Holocaust, and the author's article is not gratuitously offensive, 
or insulting, and did not incite disrespect or hatred or cast doubt on 
clearly established historical facts. 236 Therefore, in the Court's view, 
the interference was not necessary in a democratic society and the 
charge of defamation of the Christian community did not confront a 
pressing social need. 237 Though the criminal charge was acquitted and 
the civil decision ordered a remedy of merely 1 FRF in damages and 
publication of a notice of the ruling, the involvement of a criminal 
offence per se amounted to a deterrent effect and the sanction appeared 
to be disproportionate in the Court's view.238 
Though this case did not involve the dead' s reputation, it 
eventually reflects the never-modest reactions from religious groups, 
including threatening dissents with defamation petitions, either criminal 
or civil. In this case, Christians are no different from Muslims in 
defending their beliefs. Not so long ago, Robert Katz wrote in his book 
Death in Rome, which was subsequently turned into a film Massacre in 
Rome (1973), that then deceased Pope Pius XII knew the planned 
executions of Italians nineteen hours before the event. The killings 
were in reprisal of the deaths of Germans in Rome due to a partisan 
attack. The Vatican denied Katz's allegation of the Pope's silence.239 A 
niece of the Pope lodged the case in the Italian courts claiming 
defamation of her uncle's memory. Katz lost his criminal case and was 
sentenced to fourteen months imprisonment, which was eventually set 
233. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para. 44. 
234. Id. 
235. See id. para. 50. 
236. See id. para. 51-52. 
237. See id. para. 53. 
238. Giniewski, App. No. 64016/00, para.14. 
239. See Robert Katz, TELEGRAPH, available at 
http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/news/obituaries/religion-obituaries/8144130/Robert-Katz.html 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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aside following an amnesty in 1980.240 
The Italian judges in charge carried out an investigation of 
historical event themselves for two years, trying to find out what really 
happened on March 23rd and 24th of 1943. They travelled around Italy 
and Germany to interview witnesses. 241 The local court concluded that 
the "one and only truth" is that Pius XII did not know anything about 
the planned reprisal, at least no proof could be shown to the court. 242 
The Appeal Court quashed the decision of the first instance court and 
decided not to get into any historical ascertainment of truth. It granted 
the historian "an almost absolute immunity on the basis of Article 3 3 of 
the Italian Constitution."243 However, the Court of Cassation 
overturned this ruling and Katz's immunity was abolished. The case 
was sent back to the Appeal Court of Rome, which ruled against Katz 
and restated the "truth" established by the local court. According to 
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich, the final decision is extremely long and 
more like a historical treatise than a judicial opinion, and the court has 
somehow established an official, authoritative version of the story to 
rep lace Katz's findings. 244 
G. Holocaust Deniers and Revisionists 
We must, when appreciating Rosmus-Wenninger's courage and 
achievements in revealing historical truth, 245 pay attention to a different 
category of historical studies that are not favoured by many state laws 
and communities, as well as historians. History revisionists and 
Holocaust deniers belong to this category in advocating different 
versions of the dark sides of human history such as war crimes, 
genocides and atrocities against humanity and concluded with clearly 
established historical facts. 246 Their expressions have been strictly 
240. See id.; see also WEBER, supra note 46 (another version of the story is that the 
Supreme Court of Italy threw out the case after several appeals ten years later); see also 
Emma Brown, Robert Katz, 77, Wrote History of WWII Massacre in Italy, WASH. POST, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/2 l/ AR2010102105984.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
241. See Giorgio Resta & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Judicial Truth and Historical 
Truth: The Case of the Ardeatine Quarries Massacre , 31 L. & HIST. Rev. 844, 877 (2013) 
for a more detailed analysis of the case. 
242. See id. (the Court's role in finding historical truth would be under critiques of 
many historians and lawyers); see also discussion infra Section VI. 
243. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877. 
244. See id. at 878. 
245. See discussion infra Section IV.A for her story. 
246. See Lehideux & Isomi v. France, App. No. 1045/839, 1997 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on 
H.R. 55 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (ruling speeches denying Holocaust are not protected by 
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights). 
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restricted in most W estem democracies whose laws directly treated such 
expressions as crimes against humanity and human dignity, 247 even in 
the case that such expressions are presented as academic discourse or an 
extreme form of freedom of expression. This is in particular the case in 
countries whose people experienced such tragedies. 
When Garaudy challenged the orthodoxies of the Holocaust 
against Jews and the existence of Hilter's final solution in his book The 
Founding Myth of Modern Israel, he was found guilty of denial of 
crimes against humanity, racially defamatory statements, and incitement 
to racial hatred. 248 Before the ECtHR, Garaudy claimed that his views 
were not revisionist and his book was a political piece of work, instead 
of historical, questioning Israeli policies. He also complained that his 
book had been misunderstood and distorted by French Courts. 249 
Garaudy submitted to the Court that the 24 bis of Act of 29 July 1881 
Law, the French Freedom of Press Act, created "a censorship 
mechanism that wrongfully restricted freedom of expression. "250 
The Court reiterated that justification of a pro-Nazi policy is 
against the Convention's fundamental values and could not be allowed 
to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10.251 It regarded the 
author's expressions and ideas in the book not as historical research 
akin to a quest for the truth, but as trying to rehabilitate the National-
Socialist regime and accusing victims of falsifying history. It concluded 
that "denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most 
serious forms of racial defamation of Jews and of incident to hatred of 
them."252 
But the latest decision of the Court shows a different tendency on a 
similar issue: the Armenian genocide, which has been long debated by 
history scholars all through the world and the official history of Turkey 
247. See Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment The Quest for 
Truth in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV 35, 77 (1997). 
248. See Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01 (E. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2003), available 
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). Exclusion of protection of free speech rights of Holocaust denial and other similar 
speeches from Article 10 of the Convention, according to some scholars, is not justified and 
the case law of ECtHR shall be changed. See, e.g., Hannes Cannie & Dirk Voorhoof, The 
Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights Convention: An 
Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?, 29 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. 
RTs. 54, 83 (201 l)("Applying the abuse clause in order to deal with and legitimize the 
criminalization of the worst kinds of speech is not a desirable project for the future 
development of democracy in Europe."). 
249. See Garaudy, App. No.65831/01, para. 17-18. 
250. Id. para 20. 
251. See id. para. 22. 
252. Id. para. 23. 
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is under constant criticism. In Perincek v. Switzerland, the Court denied 
the genocide from falling into the legal concept of "genocide" precisely 
defined by the International court of Justice and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and thus not convinced by the Swiss 
court's decision.253 It regarded the plaintiffs as engaging in speech of a 
historical, legal and political nature as part of a heated debate. 254 
Many jurisdictions have special memory laws to punish speeches 
of deniers of the Holocaust, atrocities, war crimes and massacres and 
related revisionists.255 In Europe, negationism is punishable in 
countries such as Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Portugal 
and Switzerland. 256 Regarding revisionism in Europe, Germany and 
France use different legal terms to cover revisionist views, including 
approval or justification, and contestation. 257 This includes, in the 
European context, three verbs - to deny, to justify, and to minimize -
repeatedly used to define negationism and revisionism. 258 
Memory law can be used by new democracies to declare a clear-
cut departure from the past, although possibly at the cost of free 
expression, which they should respect and protect more. Consequent to 
the recent democratization process, Cambodia has recently passed the 
Law Against Non-recognition of the Crimes Committed during the 
Democratic Kampuchea Period, which attracted criticism from 
ARTICLE 19, a NGO defending free speech rights across the world and 
taking its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The law's purpose is to punish those who do not recognize, 
downplay, deny, or dispute the existence of the massive crimes in the 
253. See Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Criminal Conviction for 
Denial that the Atrocities Perpetrated Against the Armenian People in 1915 and Years After 
Constituted Genocide was Unjustified ((E. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2013), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4613832-5581451#{%22itemid 
%22:[%22003-4613832-5581451%22]} (last visited Dec. 3, 2014)[hereinafter Judgment 
Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release]. 
254. See id. at 3. 
255. Revisionist perspective does not deny the Holocaust but rather aims to challenge 
the conventional view of responsibility for it; Negationist perspective denies the existence of 
holocaust, disregards settled historical norms, and distorts the relationship between the 
Holocaust and historical reality. See Emanuela Fronza, Punishment of Negationism: The 
Difficult Dialogue Between Law and Memory, 30 VT. L. Rev. 609, 613- 14 (2005); see also 
Pascale Bloch, Response to Professor Fronza 's the Punishment of Negationism, 30 VT. L. 
REV. 627 (2005). 
256. See Fronza, supra note 256, at 614-17. 
257. See id. at 618. 
258. Id. at 619. 
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Democratic Kampuchea period. 259 
Other jurisdictions, in contrast, are more tolerant and do not punish 
such expressions as Guraudy' s that, according to ECtHR, are certainly 
against humanities and lead to racial defamation of Jews. In these 
jurisdictions, free speech rights are more respected and better protected, 
with the protection extending to extreme expressions. 
The Canadian Supreme Court decided so in the famous 1992 Case 
of R. v. Zundel. 260 Ernst Zundel was very determined in voicing doubts 
over the Holocaust of Jews in his self-published pamphlet called Did Six 
Million Really Die ?261 He was convicted for spreading false news 
contrary to Section 181 of the Canadian Criminal Code.262 Regarded as 
revisionist history, the pamphlet proposed: inter alia, the amount of 
Jewish victims is exaggerated and the Holocaust is a myth made by the 
Jewish conspiracy.263 After convicted twice in lengthy legal 
proceedings, Zundel appealed and the Canadian Supreme Court held 
that the appeal shall be admitted and Section 181 is unconstitutional. 264 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing on behalf of the Court, said that 
Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects 
all expression of non-violent form, and the content of Zundel's 
pamphlet is irrelevant in the instant case. 265 Furthermore, "[ t ]his Court 
has repeatedly affirmed that all communications which convey or 
attempt to convey meaning are protected by [Section] 2(b ), unless the 
physical form by which the communication is made ( for example, by a 
violent act) excludes protection."266 
One may compare Zundel with an earlier 1990 case Keegstra. The 
Canadian Supreme Court ruled differently, upholding Keegstra's 
259. Cambodia: Law Against Non-Recognition of the Crimes Committed During 
Democratic Kampuchea, AR TIC LE 19 ( June 2013 ), available at 
http://www.article 19 .org/data/files/medialibrary/3 7127 /13-06-27-cambodia-LA.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 3 2014). 
260. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). 
261. See id. at 743. 
262. See id. at 744. 
263. See id. 
264. Seeid. 
265. R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (Can.). Zundel was also involved in two other 
cases regarding Holocaust denial and finally was denounced by the Canadian authority as a 
threat to national security who denied his application for Canadian citizenship. Deported 
back to Germany, he was convicted of repeated Holocaust denials and sentenced to five 
years imprisonment in 2007. Associated Press, German Activist Ernst Zundel Gets 5 Years 
for Denying Holocaust, Fox NEWS (Feb. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/02/16/german-activist-emst-zundel-gets-5-years-for-
denying-holocaust (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
266. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 753. 
50
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4
2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy 89 
conviction of hate propaganda and dissemination. 267 In this case, 
Justice McLachlin, as the dissenting judge, opined in similar lines as in 
Zundel that the alleged speeches conveyed a meaning or a message of 
non-violent nature.268 Thus, it is under the protection of Section 2(b ), 
which protects the fundamental rights to free expression and thought. 269 
It "protects all content of expression irrespective of the meaning or 
message sought to be conveyed, no matter how offensive it may be."270 
She reasoned that "Section 319(2) does not constitute a reasonable limit 
upon free speech" and "lacks the required degree of proportionality.'' 271 
In the United States, freedom of expression extends even to a much 
wider scope including hate speeches and Holocaust denial. As 
Persinger noted, "[ o ]ne of the principles this country holds dear is the 
opportunity to express and receive information regardless of how 
unpopular it may be. "272 This broadened free speech protection covers 
civil public discourses, including hate speeches and speeches denying 
Holocaust for various reasons.273 Lasson noticed that the only 
jurisprudential remedy against Holocaust denial was by means of 
contract law.274 The related case is about a Holocaust survivor who 
won back his denied award of $50,000 for providing successful 
evidence for the death of Jews at Auschwitz offered by the Institute for 
Historical Review.275 
The American Constitution, said Lidsky, does not allow the State 
to "punish citizens for holding anti-Semitic beliefs nor prevent them 
from receiving information likely to foster such beliefs."276 It is 
strongly argued that rebuttal of such speeches should be combated in 
markets of free speech and the State should be out of this terrain, since 
potential censorship may follow state interference in public discourses 
267. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 795-96 (Can.). 
268. Id. at 701. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. at 703, 706. 
272. Jason Persinger, The Harm to Student First Amendment Rights When School 
Boards Make Curricular Decisions in Response to Political Pressure: A Critique of 
Griswold v. Driscoll, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 312 (2012). 
273. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Where's the Harm?: Free Speech and the Regulation 
of Lies, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1091, 1092 (2008) ( arguing "unlike other countries, the 
United States has never justified the regulation of verifiably false speech on the grounds of 
that it poses a generalized threat of dignitary harm," such as Holocaust denial speeches). 
274. See Lasson, supra note 248, at 77. 
275. Id. 
276. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095. 
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that are critical to a democracy. 277 
For many, the protection of free speech by the Americans probably 
goes too far sometimes, in particular for those who regard such 
unpopular, distorted speeches as a means to engrain critical thinking for 
students and provide bad examples. When Myers sought to remove 
books of Holocaust-denial nature at Texas A&M University Library, 
worrying about their influences among students, he was only able to get 
them removed from the category of Holocaust and Jewish History to a 
different sub-category called Errors and Inventions. Even worse, he 
attracted criticisms from fellow scholars across the country, arguing that 
any suppression of books is wrong, no matter how repugnant their 
message, since no fine line can be drawn on the issue. 278 Even his 
sympathizers agreed that such books should not be removed so that they 
could be used to study anti-Semitism.279 
The popular fear among the Americans of a slippery road to state 
censorship of free expression bears a heavier weight than their impulse 
to prevent dignitary harms, mental distress, incitement, and social 
disorder consequent to such expressions. 280 The First Amendment right 
of free expression has been worshiped on the sanctuary altar by many 
Americans as an absolute right. 281 
H. Immortality in the Information Age 
The Information Age has fundamentally changed the situations of 
posthumous reputation and history studies. Online defamation and 
privacy invasion cases have attracted attentions of legal scholars to 
debate their impact on defamation law and privacy law all over the 
world. Due to the information persistence on and easy access to the 
Internet, 282 on the one hand, the dead' s reputation can be kept longer 
277. See id. at 1095-99 (illustrating the reasons to allow the breathing space for lies); 
see also Lasson, supra note 248, at 52-64 (discussing the First Amendment consideration 
regarding Holocaust denial speeches in U.S. law). 
278. See Mary Ann Roser, A&M Professor Stirs Debate over Holocaust Denial Books, 
H-NET (Apr. 11, 1996, 11: 15 PM), available at 
http://h-net.msu.edu/ cgi-bin/logbrowse. pl ?trx=vx&list=h-
ho locaust&month=9604&week=b&msg=M vFTsuPctbrs 1 hgNxSzTTQ&user=&pw= (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
279. Lasson, supra note 248, at 43. 
280. See id. at 68 (Lasson argued that "anything which restricts this right (freedom of 
self-expression) is a step on the road toward tyranny."). 
281. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245 (1961). 
282. See SIMSON GARFfNKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (O'Reilly Media 2001) (discussing the threat of the Internet to personal data 
protection for information persistency); see also Jean-Francois Blanchette & Deborah G. 
52
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4
2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy 91 
and become known via the Internet, and therefore becomes more 
connected with history. On the other hand, the popular use of the 
Internet makes defamation of the dead much easier because everyone 
has the chance to speak to the whole world on social media and social 
networks. While the Internet has posed a new threat to the reputations 
of the deceased, it also provides a new forum for public discussion of 
the past. The Internet has escalated the conflict between free expression 
and protection of the dead's reputation and privacy. 
Disclosure of the dead' s information, even for good purposes, 
attracts complaints from surviving families. In 2003, Dutch citizen 
Eiseres, as the only daughter of her Jewish parents and one of the so-
called child survivors, sued in Amsterdam for the publication of 
information of her dead parents and her family. The Foundation of 
Digital Monument of the Jewish Community in Netherlands (Stichting 
Digitaal Monument Joodse Gemeenschap) was founded in 2000 for the 
purposes of keeping alive the memory of the dead victims of the Nazi 
Holocaust and for promoting scientific research and use of educational 
materials.283 The plaintiff complained that the online publication of her 
family's data caused her psychological damage and invaded the privacy 
of the family. 284 The Amsterdam court judged in favor of the 
foundation after considering the facts that the deceased victims' 
information has already been disclosed online and such publication is 
not in violation of their honor and reputation in reality. It ruled that the 
publication is not unlawful and does not lead to abuse of right, 285 so that 
in the instant case "the importance of freedom of expression shall 
prevail. "286 
In some jurisdictions, the dead's online reputation has been well 
secured, which leads to censorship of history from state authorities. The 
Thai government, for instance, blocked the domestic access to the Yale 
University Press website in 2006 when the latter planned to publish Paul 
Handley's The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol 
Adulyadej. 287 The book portrayed a disfavored image of the dead king 
Johnson, Data Retention and the Panopticon Society: The Social Benefits of Forgetfulness, 
18 INFO. Soc'Y 33 (2002); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 88 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-
paradox/right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
283. HR 12 november 2003, KB 2003, 1363 m.nt GJ (Eiseres/ Stichting Digitaal 
Monument Joodse Gemeenschap in Nederland en Gedaagde)(Neth.)[hereinafter Eiseres]. 
284. Id. at 6.1. 
285. Id. at7.4. 
286. Id. (" ... moet het belang van de uitingsvrijheid de doorslag geven."). 
287. James Warrick-Alexander, Thailand Bars Univ. Website, YALE DAILY NEWS, 
available at http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2006/02/06/ _-31649/ (last visited Jan 9, 2015). 
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in contrast to the popular official image and encountered many 
obstacles in publication and dissemination from the Thai state 
authority. 288 In 2011, Joe Gordon, a Thai-born American, was punished 
with two and a half years' imprisonment for his defaming the royal 
family after he posted translated sections of the book online on 
American territory. 289 In such jurisdictions, the Internet has become a 
new battlefield to suppress criticisms of official history and national 
honor, of which posthumous defamation is a handy cause of action 
ready for use. 
V. FREE SPEECH AND HISTORY CENSORSHIP 
Many may regard the American law's strong protection of free 
speech, including hate speech and revisionism or negationism, as 
radical. But from another point of view, such protection draws a clean 
line to prevent the potential instrumental use of defamation law and 
privacy law to introduce history censorship by political power. As the 
protection of posthumous dignitarian personality rights covers the 
dead's reputation and privacy, we have observed the disproportional 
restrictions of free expression of journalists or historians by European 
domestic courts that were overruled by ECtHR. 290 
In this regard, the common law's general rejection of protecting 
posthumous reputation has wiped out the possibility totally, unless it has 
a strong connection to the living's legally protected interest. One has to 
admit that the American approach is the approach to best meet the 
international standards promulgated by abovementioned international 
human rights law. 
A. International Standards 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
("UDHR") protects the right to free expression and the rights to seek, 
288. Jane Perlez, A Banned Book Challenges Saintly Image of Thai King, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sep. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/world/asia/25thailand.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
289. Thai Judge Gives American Two Years' Jail for "Insulting Monarchy", 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011 /dec/08/thai-american-jail-insulting-monarchy (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
290. See generally Editions Pion v. France, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (2004); 
Lehideux v. France, 1998-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Mizzi v. Malta, Chamber Judgment Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2006). 
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receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. 291 Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") 
prescribes in particular the right to freedom of expression and freedom 
to access to information and ideas, and recognizes relative duties and 
responsibilities carried with such rights, like to respect others' 
reputation, etc. 292 Article 20 of ICCPR excludes expressions of 
"propaganda of war, advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" from its 
protection. 293 The rights to freedom of expression under such 
international treaties are broad enough to include and extend to "almost 
everything intended to covey meaning", including "information and 
ideas of all kinds",294 even speeches regarded as "deeply offensive."295 
According to these international treaties, expressions of historical 
research nature shall be protected by domestic law - in the same way as 
expressions of political discourse, 296 political canvassing, 297 
journalism,298 cultural and artistic expression,299 teaching,300 religious 
discourse,301 etc.302 In particular, General Comment No. 34 of the 
Human Rights Committee pointed out that "[ a ]11 forms of opinion are 
protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or 
religious nature. It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalize the 
holding of an opinion."303 If such standards can be strictly taken into 
291. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
292. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2200A(XXI), (Mar. 23, 1976). 
293. Id. art. 20. 
294. Id. art. 19. 
295. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of 
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 11, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102 nd Sess., (July 2011 ). 
296. See generally Essono Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Communication No. 
414/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994). 
297. Concluding Observations on Japan, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., Oct. 30, 
2008, para. 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/JPN/C0/5, (Oct. 2008). 
298. Mavlonov and Sa'di v. Uzbekistan, Human Rights Comm, 95th Sess., March 16-
Apr. 9, 2009, para. 8.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 (March 19, 2009). 
299. Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., March 
15-Apr. 2, 2004, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR//C/80/D/926/2000 (2004). 
300. Ross v. Canada, Human Rights Comm., May 1, 1996, para. 11.1,U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (2000). 
301. Id. at 11.5. 
302. See generally Cambodia: Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, 
ARTICLE 19, (June 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37121/en/cambodia:-joint-submission-to-
the-un-universal-periodic-review (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (discussion of International 
standards). 
303. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34 on Art. 19: Freedoms of 
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account by the contracting states of the ICCPR, they shall have not 
criminalized Holocaust deniers and revisionists. In practice, most such 
laws are justified by prevention of racial discrimination, racial 
incitement, to "national security or of public order ( order public), or of 
public health or morals", as prescribed by Article 19. 304 
The strong tune of these important international laws, of which 
most western countries are signatories, has been much softened in legal 
realities even in European democracies. As discussed in the above 
Section IV (G), European democracies such as France, Spain, Germany 
and Belgium have adopted memory laws regarding Nazi Holocausts, 
atrocities and other crimes against humanity. Furthermore, recently the 
new democracies in Eastern Europe have passed laws condemning the 
past sins of the communists, including the Ukrainian Famine.305 Even 
the European Union proposed a legislative framework for Member 
States that certain forms of conducts committed for a racist or 
xenophobic purpose such as, among others, "'publicly condoning, 
denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes' should be punished with between one and 
three years' imprisonment. "306 
This attitude can be witnessed in ECtHR judgments. For example, 
in Garaudy, the Court unanimously ruled that speech in justification of 
a pro-Nazi policy could not be protected under Article 10, since it 
belongs to the clearly established historical facts and is "against the 
Convention's underlying values."307 But similar laws are not without 
criticisms. 308 Even in France, which has taken to more memory laws 
than others with respect to Holocaust denial, Armenian genocide, slave 
trade and French colonialism, the French Constitutional Council 
announced the Armenian Genocide Law to be unconstitutional in a 
Opinion and Expression, Sept. 12, 2011, para. 9, CCPR/C/GC/34, 102nd Sess., (July 2011) 
( emphasis added by author). 
304. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 293, art. 19 
305. Josie Appleton, Freedom for History? The Case Against Memory Laws, FREE 
SPEECH DEBATE (April 3, 2013), available at 
http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/freedom-for-history-the-case-against-memory-laws/ 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
306. Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, 
2008 O.J. (L328/55) Art. l(l)(c), Art. 3(2), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008F0913 :EN :NOT (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
307. Garaudy V. France, HUMAN RJGHTS AND PUB. LAW UPDATE, available at 
http://www.lcor.com/1315/?form_l 155.replyids=875 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). 
308. See Gerald Tishler, When Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech Confront 
Holocaust Denial and Group Libel: Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 65 
(1988). 
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2012 decision. 309 The protection of free speech regarding the Armenian 
genocide has been supported most recently in a ECtHR judgment on 
December 17th, 2013 which overruled his criminal conviction under 
Swiss Criminal Code for "racialist discrimination."310 
B. Historical Truth or Judicial Truth 
While expressions regarding clearly established historical facts 
lead to controversies, it is easy for courts of law to make decisions, 
since there is no need to decide the truth of alleged expressions such as 
Holocaust denial and past atrocities. The court's role is to analyze the 
desired aims, the deployed methods and the content of the expression, 
and then decide whether or not such expression denies clearly 
established historical facts. 311 Whether memory laws are really a threat 
to free speech rights of the public, in particular historians, deserves 
more analysis when they restrict dissents of clearly established facts. 
Still, it is important to consider the common law approach that a clear-
cut line is the best to protect free speech and to prevent state 
interference of free expression in posthumous defamation cases from 
sneaking into history censorship. 
However, when controversies involve historical facts that are not 
clearly established, adjudicating courts will face difficulties, first in 
checking if such alleged expressions are true, and second, in balancing 
free speech rights with posthumous reputation protection. 
Most courts will refuse to engage themselves in investigating 
historical facts or truth, because courts are neither composed for such 
purposes nor suitable for such tasks,312 when truth is an absolute defense 
in many jurisdictions. 313 The argument from historians that historical 
309. Nicholas Vinocur & Jon Hemming, French Court Rules Armenian Genocide Law 
Unconstitutional, NAT'L POST (Feb, 28, 2012), available at 
http ://news.nationalpost.corn/2012/02/28/french-court-rules-armenian-genocide-law-
unconstitutional/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
310. Judgment Perincek v. Switzerland Press Release, supra note 254. 
311. Garaudy v. France, App. No.65831/01, para. 2 (E. Ct. R.R. June 24, 2003), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-23829 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014) (highlighting the French government's replies to the ECtHR). 
312. The ECtHR in Chauvy explicated "it is an integral part of freedom of expression 
to seek historical truth and it is not the Court's role to arbitrate the underlying historical 
issues, which are part of a continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the 
events which took place and their interpretation." Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01, 
para. 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
313. An exception, for example, is Israeli Defamation Act that does not recognize 
truthfulness as a defense except a case is of public concern, though in practice "the courts 
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truth should be settled among historians themselves instead of in court 
is popularly supported and catches the nerves of judges.314 Due to the 
vagueness of truth in historical study, judges are uncomfortable with 
truth defenses and will try to avoid questing controversial content at 
stake.315 And if they cannot consider the truth-value of facts and 
opinions,316 judges can only rely on the facts and opinions brought up 
by parties whose reliability is within their expertise. 317 Judges will 
decide on other standards that qualify such speeches to be under 
protection, such as qualified professional methods, fair comment, public 
interest, balanced opinions, prudence, and good faith. 318 
But some judges do go that far to verify the truthfulness of 
defamation. In the above-discussed Italian case in 1970s, the Italian 
court conducted a two-year-long investigation in order to find what had 
happened, so that the dead Vatican Pop Pius XII was proved innocent of 
Katz's allegation of moral defects in being a bystander to the Ardeatine 
Quarries Massacre in Rome. 319 If courts involve themselves in such 
activities, then "the feasibility and desirability of authoritative judicial 
resolutions in matters of truth and falsity" is continuously under 
doubt. 320 The Israeli Supreme Court, in Sharon v. Benziman, ruled that 
given other grounds to decide the case exists; judges shall avoid 
determining historical truth. 321 The fallout of court-decided historical 
truth is that any potential mistakes in the future can impair the judiciary 
authority before the public. However, the Israeli courts have performed 
such a role in seeking historical truth in past decisions. According to 
Barak-Erez, the courts' recounts of the past have served as the official 
history of the Israeli state and its official institutions within which the 
state organs operate including the judiciary. 322 
If misjudgments were made, they have to be followed in later cases 
and this puts courts in a passive position when new evidence or new 
facts may emerge regarding the same historical controversy. The 
judiciary' s independence, very much dependent on the separation of its 
seem to find public concern in the bulk of true publications". But cf Peled, The Israeli Law 
of Defamation: A Comparative Perspective and a Sociological Analysis, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 735, 757 (2012). 




318. See id. at 87. 
319. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 877. 
320. Peled, supra note 79, at 756. 
321. Id. at 757. 
322. Barak-Erez, supra note 29, at 100-01. 
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authority over legal issues from political power, will be diminished. 
Resta and Zeno-Zencovich observed this in their research concerning 
the dilemma between historical truth and judicial truth confronted by 
Italian courts. 323 As in the Katz case, when new evidence was released 
by the CIA and the Vatican Archives, new doubts raised, which proved 
that courts may not be the appropriate place to settle historical 
disputes. 324 The two authors in particular noted that when facts and past 
behaviors were evaluated in a court trial, the judgment made a judicial 
version of history and it entered the judicial circuit, influencing sequent 
decisions in a circular and self-referential way. 325 As the authors 
observed in Italian cases regarding historical controversies, judicial 
truth "starts to work as an external limit on the freedom of the media to 
report about an historical event. "326 
C. The Icons of History Censorship 
Because it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek 
historical truth, 327 a total ban on contesting speeches against official or 
popular history- including those with well-established historical facts -
may lead to censorship of history, even in case of the Holocaust and 
atrocities. While totalitarian states use censorship to gain legitimacy by 
forbidding open debate over historical lies, democracies should be 
confident in open discourses of dark past in order to protect free speech 
in abstract sense, avoiding any slippery move toward state interference, 
and protecting the breathing space even for lies. 328 Constitutional courts 
should have a more active role to play in striking down such laws, as the 
French Constitutional Council's recent move in quashing the French 
government's peppy intervention of history, though somehow at the 
price of mental distress to Armenian people. History is not the stuff of 
justice, as Wartanian warned, "it belongs to historians who rectify lies, 
not to politicians. "329 As courts cannot decide on the truthfulness of the 
323. Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 880-86. 
324. Id at878- 79. 
325. Id at 874- 78. In multiple related cases regarding the Ardeatine Quarries 
Massacre in Rome, Italian courts offered different evaluations of historical facts. Id 
326. Id at 874. 
327. Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
328. Lidsky, supra note 274, at 1095. 
329. See Raffi Wartanian, Memory Laws in France and their Implications: 
Institutionalizing Social Harmony, HUMANITY IN ACTION, available at 
http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/l 17-memory-laws-in-france-and-their-
implications-institutionalizing-social-harmony (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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presented evidence by different parties, they have to ask for testimony 
from historians as expert witness. 330 
Courts should act more carefully in defamatory cases that involve 
historical facts that are not so clearly established but are of public 
interest. Courts shall leave historical facts for open discussions by 
others including historians. In such cases, courts also need to balance 
the dead's dignity, including their privacy and reputation - as well as 
their family's interests, both dignitary and commercial - with free 
speech rights of others. Since interference of free speech may be 
justified by protecting posthumous reputation, which is a legitimate goal 
in many laws, the focus of courts should be on seeking good balance, 
not investigation of truthfulness of the alleged expressions. But how 
can we judge the existence of potential chilling effects in court's 
balancing process or, more generally, in a judicial system? What are 
the possible criteria to define possible history censorship in court 
verdicts? 
Above all, in my view we may look at how many categories of 
defense are available to defendants in defamation cases. The more 
defenses are allowed, and the higher the threshold of restriction of free 
expression, the less opportunity for censorship of history in court 
decisions. 
As the oldest defense for defamation, truth defense has not been 
allowed as complete defense in some criminal charges. 331 When truth 
does not matter in defamation convictions, the purpose of the law is to 
protect the political authority or social ordering. 332 In criminal 
procedures, a combination of presumption of innocence and truth 
defense will obviously offer the charged a strong protection against 
defamation accusations. In Colombani & Others v. France, the ECtHR 
330. There are critics against historians' role in court testimony. See Richard J. Evans, 
History, Memory, and the Law: The Historian as Expert Witness, 41 HIST. & THEORY 326 
(2002) (commenting on Henry Rousso's book, the author argued that historians shall only 
elucidate the historical context and avoid being involved in judging whether an individual 
was guilty or otherwise of a crime). 
331. See Elaine Pearson, Criminal Defamation Laws in Indonesia Stifle Democracy, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/10/criminal-defamation-
laws-indonesia-stifle-democracy (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing the fact that in 
Indonesian law, truth is not a defense if an official found your expression to be insulting); 
Friedman, supra note 66, at 54 (noting that the truth only became an absolute defense in 
more democratic time; and authoritarian governments do not like criticism since truth hurts, 
so that in many ways the situation would be even worse if such charges were true, as said in 
the old maxim). 
332. Elizabeth Samson, The Freedom to Speak Truth to Power, GUARDIAN, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/libertycentral/2012/apr/20/1 ibel-law-tourism-
reform (last visited Dec. 3 2014). 
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regarded the rejection of the French judiciary of the applicant's use of 
truth defense as "beyond what is required to protect a person's 
reputation and right, even if that person was a head of a state or 
government. "333 
Another important defense widely adopted in most W estem 
democracies is the public figure rule in particular in the U.S., which 
offers more protection over speeches regarding public figures. 334 The 
Chinese defamation law has not recognized such a doctrine though 
some judges have mentioned it in the latest verdicts. 335 This means that 
Chinese public figures, especially political figures, will enjoy equal 
protection of law with average people, while holding higher social 
status offers them more influence on public affairs. In Europe, the 
public figure doctrine ( or rule) has gained more support at least in some 
ECtHR decisions. As in recent Joe Luis, the Court ruled that the limits 
of acceptable criticism in view of the press "are accordingly wider with 
regard to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relating to a 
private individual"; and politicians "must display a greater degree of 
tolerance. "336 Again, in Lehideux & lsorni v. France, the Commission 
emphasized the importance of historical debate about a public figure 
and the related different opinions.337 In Suarez v. Spain, it stated that 
"[ e ]xceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted 
333. Colombani & Others v. France, App No 51279/99, para. 66 (E. Ct. H.R. Sept. 25, 
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60532 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
334. For an explanation of the public figure doctrine in U.S. law; see Scott 
Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public 
Figures, 49 AM. Bus. L.J. 125-208 (2012); George E. Stevens, Local and Topical Pervasive 
Public Figures After Gertz., 66 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 463 (1989); Catherine Hancock, 
Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, N.Y. INT'L L. 
REY. 81 (2006); James C. Mitchell, The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the Gertz: All 
Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of "Celebrity Journalism", 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 
REV. 559 (2002); John J. Watkins, The Demise of the Public Figure Doctrine, J. COMMC'N: 
A PUBL'N NAT'L Soc'y FOR STUDY COMMC'N 47 (1977). 
335. Hou Shoujin yu Zhongguodianying Jituan Gongshi Deng Qinhaimingyuquan An 
I]! Huo Shoujin v. China Film Group et al.] 
(Beijing High Ct. 2007) (China) available at 
http://www.fsou.com/html/text/fnl/1176753/l l 7675388.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
336. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26 (2010); Case of Jerusalem v. 
Austria, App. No. 26958/95, para. 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 27, 2001), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-59220 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
337. Lehideux, App. No. 24662/94, para. 45; see Von Hannover v. Germany (No.2), 
App. Nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, para. 64, 69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-109029 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014) (explaining wider protection of privacy for public figures' awarded even when no 
public interest is involved in publication). 
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restrictively."338 In the 2013 Eon v. France, it emphasised on the wider 
range of criticism of politicians than ordinary people, since they 
willingly subject themselves to public and media scrutiny. 339 
In addition, the Assembly Resolution of the Council of Europe on 
the Right to Privacy prescribes that the right to privacy of public figures 
is lucrative and often invaded, but they must recognize that the social 
position they occupy in society automatically entails increased pressure 
on their privacy. 340 Also, most recently, the Council of Europe adopted 
a rule similar to public figure doctrine to restrict the extra-protection of 
public figures in their privacy (family life) and reputation. 341 
The admission of opinions and fair comment for defense are 
important for free speech protection. After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co.,342 the U.S. defamation law has moved away from the long doctrine 
since Sullivan,343 and a defense similar to opinion privilege has been 
adopted by the ECtHR when opinions or fair comments are "on a matter 
of public interest which was underpinned by a sufficient factual 
basis. "344 
In addition, courts should allow historians and journalists the 
defenses of professional standards, sufficient prudence, good faith, and 
participation in academic debates. 345 Once courts are willing to accept 
338. Gutierrez Suarez, App. No. 16023/07, para. 26. Also, note a series of recent 
cases judged by ECtHR regarding the analysis of term of public figures in its verdicts. See 
also Verlagsgruppe News GmbH & Bobi v. Austria, App. No. 59631/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 
3, 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-115013 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
339. ECtHR: Eon v France, ARTICLE 19 (Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37188/en/ecthr:-eon-v-france (last visited 
Dec. 3 2014). 
340. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 1165 - Right to privacy, 24th Sess., at para. 6 (1998), 
available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta98/eres 1165 .htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
341. EUR. PARL. Ass., Res. 15 77 - Towards decriminalization of defamation , 34th 
Sess., at para. 6, 17.6 (2007), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07 /eres 1577 .htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing resolutions regarding defamation and privacy laws). 
342. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (ruling the First 
Amendment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the application of state 
defamation laws). 
343. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
344. Jucha & Zak v. Poland, App. No. 19127/06, para. 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 23, 
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-113919 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
345. See DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87. 
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such defenses, even if the alleged narratives or accounts of historical 
events bear some falsity, judges in general will rule in favor of free 
speech. For instance, French historian Jean-Luc Einaudi was found 
guilty, but with no remedy awarded because his research is of a 
"serious, relevant and comprehensive" nature according to the court. 346 
In contrast, rejection of justifiable defenses in courts is a clear sign 
of potential censorship in posthumous defamation cases. As De Baets 
pointed out in his study, historians were found as defamers on the 
following grounds: "they did not interview eyewitnesses, overestimated 
the value of certain texts or acts of the complainant, did not consult 
original sources but literature only, or attached [more] importance to a 
single source. "347 De Baets' observations of the posthumous 
defamation cases find a parallel pattern in Chinese cases. In many 
cases, Chinese judges upheld defamation petitions because the authors 
did not use authoritative sources, 348 did not verify the sources used with 
the deceased's family before publication,349 did not verify the sources 
such as oral history and published individual memoirs, 350 or did not 
work with due care in some cases, 351 etc. Also, there was no distinction 
between opinions and facts in historians' alleged texts made by Chinese 
courts. 352 It proved that the more defenses that are accepted by courts, 
the more that professional methods are respected, and the less that 
censorship will occur in court decisions. 
Secondly, courts may restrict free expression on obviously weird 
grounds in some cases, when procedural requirements prevent other 
ways of protecting the deceased's reputation. In Mizzi v. Malta, the 
controversial text that was accused of being defamatory was a simple 
sentence "Dr. Boffa wanted to build there," which was read by the 
deceased's son as "attribut[ing] false and despicable intentions to his 
father,"353 and by the Maltase Court of Appeals as "it implied that Dr. 
346. Ariane Chemin, Long History of a Forgotten Massacre, LE POINT INT'L (Nov. 5, 
2011 ), available at http://www.lepointintemational.com/it/cultura/europa/765-long-history-
of-a-forgotten-massacre.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). Due to the brave historians' works 
on the subject, the killings of Algerians in France in 1961 were recognized by the French 
government and a plaque was put on the bridge where the event happened to commemorate 
the dead. Id. 
347. DEBAETS, supra note 4, at 87. 
348. See Bo Zhao, Posthumous Reputation and Posthumous Privacy in China: The 
Dead, the Law, and the Social Transition, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 269, 323 (2014). 
349. See id. at 347. 
350. See id. at 341. 
351. See id. at 347. 
352. See id. at 347-48. 
353. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 
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Boffa had taken advantage of his position as head of the civil 
administration," a reading supported by the Constitutional Court. 354 It 
was denied by the ECtHR since such a reading "made it very difficult, if 
not impossible, for the applicant to provide direct corroboration of it."355 
In the Spanish Gutierrez Suarez, the Spanish Supreme Court, was 
unable to declare defamation on solid grounds, pointed to the headline 
of the alleged article instead of body content, as violating the honor of 
the then deceased Moroccan King. 356 The ECtHR rejected this decision 
that headlines, whose aim is to call the attention of readers, must be read 
in combination with body context; and that "journalistic freedom also 
covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even 
provocation. "357 Both interpretations of such texts were strange even to 
ordinary readers. 
Lastly, censorship of free speech in posthumous defamation cases 
may generally be found in the disproportionality of court verdicts. This 
is seen either in improper protections given to posthumous reputation or 
privacy, while obviously it is not in great danger; or in the legal 
measures restricting free speech, such as injunctions, and remedies and 
damages awarded to plaintiffs, which are unusual, exceeding necessity. 
While posthumous reputation is recognized as legitimate, it is a 
delicate issue for courts to balance the deceased' s interests and their 
families' with the free speech of others, in particular when public 
interest is involved. As a fundamental value to democracy, free speech 
rights shall have certain priority, unless exceptional occasions are at 
stake. 
Take Szenes for example, where Justice Cheshin even claimed the 
equal legal status of reputation to free speech in democracy and the 
Jewish community in particular, including reputation of the dead. 358 It 
defined that among others, the realization of collective identity of the 
state, its national history, and its own social goals form part of public 
interest. 359 The Israeli Supreme Court pointed out that the petition was 
filed under the public law to protect public interest, such as protecting 
the dignity and good name of the dead, protecting historical truth and 
3, 2014). 
354. Id. para. 12, 15. 
355. Id. para. 35. 
356. The Constitutional Court of Spain upheld the decision. Gutierrez Suarez, App. 
No. 16023/07, para. 10 ("It stated that the headlines of the information led the average 
reader to believe that the Moroccan royal family had been an accomplice to illegal 
trafficking in hashish."). 
357. Id. para. 36. 
358. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 9, 12. 
359. Id. para. 17. 
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honoring national values, as well as the rights of defendants. The court 
judged that regarding the circumstances that can justify curtailing 
freedom of expression, expressions that are offensive to other's feelings 
are not a strong ground, because "if every such offense was to justify 
infringement, surely these freedoms and indeed democracy itself would 
be emptied of meaning. "360 
The court admitted that a democracy should be sensitive to such 
feelings, but "[a] democratic society is based on the recognition that the 
feelings of some will inevitably be offended by their fellows' exercise 
of their respective freedoms."361The court stated explicitly that in 
explaining the protection of heroes and collective memory, law in a 
democracy does not preserve the image of its heroes by repressing 
freedom of expression, and that truth shall reject falsehood in the free 
market of ideas. 362 In conclusion, the court rejected protection of the 
dead's name under public law, but ruled that the requested remedy 
could only be sought in private law, where the balance could be made 
differently. 363 
In the above reasoning, we observe a clear but high threshold of "a 
compelling or urgent need" to justify the restriction of free speech. 364 
This can be regarded as a standard to gauge potential censorship in 
relevant court decisions. At this point, the ECtHR carries out its 
balancing processes in a similar way when facing appeals from largely-
diversified social-cultural backgrounds, by interpreting the adjective 
"necessary" in Article 10 (2) as implying the existence of a pressing 
social need. "365 On the whole, the Court balanced different interests in 
a much-fixed pattern, in particular when it takes into account the margin 
of appreciation of Contracting States, so that it will not interfere with 
domestic affairs. 366 The Court usually checks if state interference with 
free speech has a legitimate aim prescribed by law, if such restriction is 
necessary to a democracy, and if it is in accordance with the 
360. Id. para. 20. 
361. Id. para. 22. 
362. Id. para. 27-28. 
363. Szenes, 53(3) PD 817 at para. 28. 
364. In Justice Mazza's words, "a concrete and imminent danger of uprooting the 
public order." Id. para. 28. (quoting HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Channel Two Television & 
Radio PD 51(5)193, 202 (Isr.)). 
365. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014); see Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 
2004), available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
366. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00. 
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proportionality standard, not exceeding necessity. 367 
In Chauvy, the Court noted that it must consider the public interest 
in being informed of the circumstances of the previous French 
Resistance leader, and the need to protect the reputation of Mr. and Mrs. 
Aubrac in the impugned betrayal of the book. 368 Furthermore, the Court 
prescribed that it "must verify whether the state authorities struck a fair 
balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention", 
namely the right of expression and the right of others to reputation. 369 
As pointed out already, the Court did not judge the legitimacy in 
protecting posthumous reputation or honor by contracting states, since 
this is a matter within margin of apperception. 370 It merely executed its 
supervisory role to verify the proper use of legal measures in limiting 
free speech, and the proportionality of the interference contingent on the 
nature and severity of the penalties imposed. 371 
In Pion, the Court pointed out the circumstance of time distance as 
an important element in striking a good balance. 372 The Court found the 
book ban in violation of Article 10 in that the more time elapsed after 
the President's death, the more the public interest in debating the 
President's two terms of presidency prevailed over his interest to 
medical confidentiality, in particular when the duty of confidentiality 
was breached and there was already dissemination in traditional media 
and the Intemet.373 Another important ruling from the ECtHR is that 
posthumous reputation is a much weaker interest in balancing different 
values under its protection. 374 
The discussion of the proportionality standard brings us to 
available measures used by courts to restrict free speech in posthumous 
defamation cases. Usually this could be monetary damages awarded to 
plaintiffs or defamation victims, and injunctions (prohibitory or 
367. See Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01; see Editions Pion, App. No. 58148/00. 
368. Chauvy, App. No. 64915/01, para. 69. 
369. Id. para. 70. 
370. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). 
371. Chauvy, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 78 ("Assessing the proportionality of the 
interference, the nature and severity of the penalties imposed."). 
372. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-61760 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014). 
373. Id. para. 53. 
374. Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10, para. 39 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107530 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014) (ruling that "in this respect, although the possibility of bringing such an action 
existed in the Maltese legal system .. . it is of the view that this element should have been 
considered by the domestic courts when assessing the proportionality of the interference."). 
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mandatory). Since defamation of the dead should generally cause less 
harm than defamation of the living, damages awarded accordingly 
should be comparatively lower. As seen in Mizzi v. Malta, the awarded 
damages were a symbolic amount of 700 euros. 375 Interim injunctions 
are more acceptable for prevention of potential harm when the real 
circumstances are unclear. 376 If a book has a small defamatory part 
about a deceased historical figure and can be corrected by deletion or 
change of text, banning the whole book after publication is obviously an 
indication of potential censorship by state. 377 
In many occasions, an obligatory publication of apology or court 
verdict will be ordered to restore the deceased's reputation. Though this 
might be an insult to authors, its real impact is doubtful in social reality. 
Bans and publication of apologies on widely circulated media or on the 
Internet could bring even more public attention because of the famous 
Streisand effect. 378 In the history of censorship, many times banning 
books did not stop circulations; instead the bans even brought more 
readers to banned authors. 
D. A Threat from Law or to Law? 
A last point to make is that whether a law implements history 
censorship - or censorship of expressions regarding the past of the dead 
- has to be defined more carefully, not denoted in a few cases regarding 
posthumous defamation and privacy-invasion. It has to be found in a 
series of similar cases in which judges have constantly restricted free 
speech rights with respect to historical expressions, by upholding 
defamation convictions, awarding large damages, and imposing 
unnecessary injunctions. It has to be demonstrated that the pursued 
legal aims are not just and prescribed by law. It has to be demonstrated 
that free expression has been given less weight than they should have 
been, if following the proportionality standard endorsed by the 
ECtHR.379 However, if a jurisdiction always decides in favor of 
375. See id. para. 39. Also, an award of eighty-eight Euros in damages is more or less 
symbolic in the famous Flux v. Moldova. See also Flux v. Moldova (No. 6) App. No. 
22824/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 29, 2008), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-88063 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
376. For instance, European Court of Human Rights accepted interim injunctions in 
general. Editions Pion, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 35, 48. 
377. As pointed out by the ECtHR in Pion. See id. 
378. See Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC 
(last updated June 15, 2012, 11 :19 PM), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
18458567 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
379. See discussion supra Section V(C). 
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posthumous defamation regarding deceased political figures with 
impact in history, while it awards no such protection to the ordinary 
deceased, we may observe possible censorship of history conducted in a 
legal system. 
While historians and free speech rights advocators criticize 
censorship of history via legal protection of the dead's reputation and 
privacy, proponents of posthumous dignitary rights may argue that the 
presumed chilling effects are not only imaginary, but also practically 
not true. For example, for Hannes Rosier, the idea that a posthumous 
personality right could deter valuable historical research is not well 
justified. 38° First of all, Rosler argued, since truth is the commonly 
acceptable defense of libel charges, it will motivate historians to publish 
more accurate, factually-based statements. 381 A second reason, he 
argued, is that adoption of the narrow dignitary personality right could 
encourage free speech instead of chilling it. 382 If one knows that his 
lifetime achievement and reputation in the public memory can be 
protected, he would participate more actively in public discourse and 
disclose more personal information. 383 A third reason is that due to the 
failure of the marketplace of ideas, there is public interest to protect 
reputation against defamatory statements, in particular those against the 
deceased and defenseless minorities. 384 Other arguments include the 
lack of societal interest in false communication, potential exceptional 
protection only for severely infringements, and proportional restriction 
via balanced decisions. 385 
Rosler's arguments cannot be denied in abstract. In reality, 
however, counter examples can be found in some ECtHR cases 
regarding posthumous defamation and privacy invasion. For many 
contracting states, protection of the dead's dignity and personality 
nevertheless ended up in decisions that were overturned by the Court for 
free speech protection.386 The threat from the deceased's families with 
a defamation suit, whether criminal or civil, causes authors to self-
censor before publication. The legal recognition of posthumous dignity 
380. Rosler, supra note 77, at 190. 
381. Id. at 190. 
382. Id. at 188. 
383. Id. at 188-89. 
384. Id. at 189. 
385. Rosier, supra note 77, at 188-91. 
386. See Editions Pion v. France, App. No. 58148/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 18, 2004), 
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61760 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2014); Mizzi v. Malta, App. No. 17320/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-107 530 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014 ); 
Gutierrez Suarez v. Spain, App. No. 16023/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012). 
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(including reputation, privacy, honor, etc.) per se provides a legal 
avenue to incorporate potential state censorship. This lies in the use of 
law to police the bounds of certain speeches, in particular speeches 
regarding Holocaust denial, which shall draw our caution. When state 
authority can regard all Holocaust or genocide denial or similar 
speeches illegal, it may exclude other speeches from protection of free 
speech as well, if not monitored closely by the public. Thus "a 
government that can tell us what not to say can also tell us what we 
must say", 387 which is detrimental to democracy holding free speech as 
the most fundamental value. In a more general sense, the law's 
protection of the dead' s dignitary interests and the related interest of the 
living may cause a threat or chilling effect on free speech for 
democracy. 
With respect to law's instrumental use within this context, the 
threat is not only from law, but to law itself. According to Douglas, 
"certain features that define law as a formal discourse" concerning 
harm, culpability, proof and jurisdiction, have "distort[ ed] ... the very 
history record that law has been asked to [protect]. "388 Even worse is 
that when law serves the end to protect certain kinds of information and 
suppress others, especially when involving historical facts that are too 
long to be investigated, law reaches its limit, as seen in the 
controversies around truth commissions in many post-war countries. 
With impossible missions, the real threat is to law itself, not only to 
historical research. Law cannot risk its independence, authority, and 
trust from the public to impose threat on free expression that is crucial 
to a democracy. 
VI. LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 
Law is vulnerable before politics. The Russian authority's passive 
attitude to the rehabilitation of Katyn tragedy victims showcases that a 
political state can have difficulties confronting its dark past.389 The 
unexpected termination of the official investigation of the tragedy in the 
1990s especially reveals the law's weakness in handling sensitive, 
political events. When history has a significant role to play in politics, 
387. Smith, supra note 101, at 137. 
388. Lawrence R. Douglas, Policing the Past: Holocaust Denial and the Law, in 
CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 67, 68 (Robert C. Post 
ed. , 1998). 
389. See 000 'Vesti' & Ukhov v. Russia, App. No. 21724/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30, 
2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-119969 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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censorship of history becomes feasible and law might be a victim of 
political suppression of those who talk frankly about the past. Law is 
also a product of a particular culture. While in Germany and other 
continental law countries the dead's dignity and honor is significant and 
protected as fundamental values by law, common law countries offer 
almost no protection of such posthumous interests. This section tries to 
interpret, following the above case analysis, the political and cultural 
rationales underpinning potential history censorship within different 
conceptual and cultural embeddings. 
A. Politics and Law 
Authoritarian regimes and dictatorial states have the most and 
strongest motives to censor history. The primary reason is to gain 
legitimacy and support of the public by use (misuse or abuse) of history 
of which censorship and control of the past is a necessity. Dictators 
know well the power of history and lie to distort the reputation of many 
deceased opponents. For example, Stalin removed Leon Trotsky out of 
books to dehumanize him because the true record of Trotsky denied 
Stalin as the true heir of Lenin, showing no crucial role in the 
Bolsheviks' victory. 390 The extreme use of history for legitimacy is the 
distortion of the North Korean War by North Korean dictators who 
described the West as the invader, diminished external military aids, 
and advocated "a total victory" on its own. 391 The past is usually cast as 
miserable and dark by a new political regime, so that a new community 
can be promoted and cherished for development and achievement. 
Second, the deceased can be forged either as a moral model for 
others to follow, or as negative examples punished for political 
purposes. But, such distortion or fabrication of posthumous reputation 
can cause serious distrust of the regime in eventual disclosure of facts. 
The famous Chinese moral model Lei Feng set up by communist 
propaganda recently has been under serious scrutiny by a new 
generation of historians. 392 In contrast, many landlords who are 
390. MACMILLAN, supra note 4, at 25. 
391. A similar story happens to USSR's support in North Korean's version of the War. 
Sarah Buckley, North Korea's 'Creative' History, BBC NEWS ONLINE (July 25, 2003, 14:30 
GMT), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3096265.stm (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014); Korean Independence: A History Re-Written by North Korea, NEW Focus INT'L 
(Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://newfocusintl.com/independence-day-in-north-korea-
changing-with-the-times/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
392. The defamer of the dead hero was detained by Beijing police recently in China's 
new wave to crackdown online social media which threats official authority in various 
fields. Questioning of Lei Feng's Frugality Leads to Detention, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 
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regarded as notorious and blood-sucking and who died during China's 
numerous political movements, have been later found out to be merely 
fabrications for political ends by the Chinese Communist Party. 393 
Even dictators themselves who have been worshipped by the 
populace are products of such powerful propaganda machines. Secrets 
and sins deliberately covered from being known would shock the public 
later. Mao's real characteristics nowadays gradually emerge before the 
public because of the disclosure of his brutal political decisions and 
policies from two sources: the declassification of some archives of 
former the Soviet Union regarding China, 394 and the recently published 
stories of Mao's private life by the individuals who worked for or 
around him. 395 
When public figures' reputations are so closely affiliated with the 
official history of a state, to protect their reputations is to protect the 
official history. Turkey's special law directly protects the honor and 
dignity of the dead Ataturk. 396 The Egyptian penal code criminalized 
and allowed detention for insulting the president before the Arab 
Spring. 397 In these countries, law has been openly used for suppression 
of speeches concerning the late public figures as direct censorship of 
history per se. 
"As social norms change, laws that touch on reputation and privacy 
change along with them."398 The shift in Stalin's reputation in Russia 
after his death reflects the influences of political change on social 
morals and ethos in Russian community. With the fall of communism 
in particular, the Russian authority to some extent allowed the 
2013, 8:00 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/08/21/four-detained-
for-questioning-lei-fengs-frugality/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
393. For example, Liu Wencai was a fabricated figure of the communist propaganda 
machine, which is totally against his real personality, to incite political hatred between 
classes during the Culture Revolution. Gao Wenqian & Regina Hackett, Revisiting the 
Past: Insights from the Art of the Cultural Revolution, HUMAN RTS. IN CHINA (Oct. 21, 
2009), available at http://www.hrichina.org/content/3824 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
394. See ALEXANDER v. PANTSOV & STEVEN I. LEVfNE, MAO: THE REAL STORY (Simon 
& Schuster reprint ed. 2013). 
395. Mao's personal doctor, for instance, wrote a book portraying a different private 
life from the official version, which can lower the great leader's honor. See LI ZHI-SUI, THE 
PRIVATE LIFE OF CHAIRMAN MAO (Random House 1996). 
396. Law Concerning Crimes Committed against Ataturk No. 5816, U.S. FOUNDATION, 
INC (2014), available at http://www.usefoundation.org/view/878 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 
see MELZER, supra note 56, at 40. 
397. MELZER, supra note 56, at 188. 
398. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 5. 
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discussion of Stalin's cruel ruling by historians and witnesses. 399 
Attitudes to Stalin are polarized between supporters and dissents, and 
between the Russian state authority and many EU countries that often 
compare him with Hitler. Recently top Russian leaders reclassified the 
related archives and portrayed him as an effective crisis manager. 400 
The earlier popular, liberal trend among Russian politicians after the 
collapse of communism seems to have been replaced with a strong 
sentiment of national pride and honor. This may somehow explain the 
Russian authority's reluctance to rehabilitate the deceased Polish 
victims of the Katyn tragedy, although Russia itself has a rehabilitation 
law to restore the reputations of those who died under communist 
repression. 
However, there is no turning back in Eastern European countries 
that have joined the EU and willingly embraced Western political 
ideology after the collapse of communism. Many countries in Eastern 
Europe passed rehabilitation laws, investigated previous politically 
charged suppressions, and convicted political criminals. Posthumous 
reputations that were tarnished under previous communist regimes got 
the chance to be restored and remedied. For instance, relatives of the 
deceased Latvian peasants, who died in hands of paramilitary 
combatants led by communist partisans and supported by the Russian 
during the WWII, accused the surviving partisan of war crimes for 
killing innocent civilians.401 Similar cases emerged especially after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, involving re-evaluation of communist 
resistant activities during WWII against Nazi occupation. In France, the 
Chauvy case involves the defamation of surviving communist resistant 
forces with suspicion of their potential betrayal.402 In Italy, public 
debate on the values of the communist resistance was dramatically 
reopened and the sudden increase in civil actions concerning violations 
of personality rights was an immediate byproduct of the changed 
political climate and of a new phase of public confrontation with the 
399. Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus on Stalin's Reputation, NPR (Sept. 
8, 2009, 3:18 PM), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
400. Id. 
401. See Kononov v. Latvia, App. No. 36376/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 17, 2010), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-98669 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
402. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 29, 2004), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-61861 (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
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past. 403 
Political change can cause re-evaluation of the past and reputations 
of the deceased in new democracies such as Spain, Peru, Chile, 
Argentina, etc. These countries went through political transition from 
dictatorship or totalitarian states to democracy. In these countries, it is 
possible to investigate political leaders' past sins and hidden secrets of 
militaries in previous oppression. Therefore, many people's reputations 
including the deceased could be altered in the context of political 
transition. Posthumous reputation can be protected by laws strongly 
supported by politicians who survived collapsed regimes or by their 
families and supporters who still stay in power. Further complicating 
the situation, amnesty laws may block the way to seek historical truth. 
To prevent opening old historical wounds, which may detain the 
restoration of democracy, the Spanish community reached compromise 
and passed the 1977 Amnesty Law after Franco's death. 404 Though the 
treatment of the legacy of Franco's long dictatorship is still 
controversial, defamation of Franco cannot yet be tolerated by the 
deceased' s proponents. 405 
In a sense, we may take Spanish Amnesty Law as a form of forced 
silencing or censorship of history. The 1977 Law is incompatible with 
international human rights law that overrides the imprescriptibility 
principle in criminal law. In addition, the Spanish Law to Historical 
Memory also brings the legal principles of irretroactivity and 
predictability into question. Both principles are critical to establishment 
of rule of law in new democracies. 406 If such fundamental legal 
doctrines or principles can be ignored, even for higher values like 
justice and human dignity, the authority of law and its independence 
from political power would be under threat of political whims and 
sensations, which escalate easily during political change. 
More importantly, Spain's Amnesty Law is the pact of different 
social forces that compromised their interests to have a better future. 
The law is of the nature of a social contract that should bear binding 
force over generations. A breach under political pressure can 
403. In Italy there are cases against the communist resistant force concerning the 
Ardeatine Quarries Massacre. See Resta & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 242, at 861-64. 
404. Kadribasic, supra note 108, at 132. 
405. It seemed that both supporters and the opponents have not been satisfied with the 
ways that the memory and legacy of Franco has been handled so far. Guy Hedgecoe, 
Spanish Left Cold Over 'Franco in a fridge,' DW (Aug. 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.dw.de/spanish-left-cold-over-franco-in-a-fridge/a-17029255 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
406. For a general discussion of internal principles oflaw see FULLER, supra note 8. 
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deconstruct mutual trust within the Spanish community. The idea that 
promise must be kept is essential for the existence and dignity of all 
human communities in the long run. This compromise or mutual trust 
should not be broken to meet short-term political needs. Otherwise, law 
is merely an instrument under the manipulation of politicians or the 
masses.407 
Recently, Spanish law made a significant move in Garzon in which 
law stayed away from political whim, 408 indicating that Spain now has a 
firm democracy and rule of law. In similar political context, the Israeli 
Supreme Court judged Szenes in favor of free speech, instead of being 
motivated by the political consideration to promote Israeli identity for 
state construction. 409 In this case, national identity represented by the 
deceased heroine is of political importance to collective memory and 
collective identity, but the defamatory threat is not high enough to 
require more protection than free speech. The decision would have 
been different before in the formative stage of the Israeli State, when the 
Israeli law had played a significant role in state-construction and 
identity establishment. As Bilsky noticed, this transformation period 
lasted until the 1990s since the Zionist revolution, and many of the 
constitutional moments involved transformation trials of a more 
political nature.410 
In mature democracies, law is more independent from political 
power and is strong enough to rebut the political need of history 
censorship. Free speech rights are regarded as fundamental to a well-
functioning democracy and are well protected by its constitution. 
Furthermore, political states draw legitimacy from ballots, not from 
history. Another notable reason that we see less censorship of history in 
democracies is that in democracies, citizens are treated equally as 
mature fellows, capable of making rational decisions themselves with 
free access to information. A political state is not assumed to be in the 
position to tell people what and what not to believe; which is contrary to 
authoritarian states, where there is a paternalist approach to think on 
behalf of subordinates. In addition, we have to note that democratic 
communities are more tolerant due to multiculturalist nature, 
407. For a discussion of the independence oflaw and rule of law in Modem state from 
politics see PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978). 
408. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 176. 
409. See generally HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority 53(3) PD 817 
[ 1999] (Isr. ). 
410. LEORA BILSKY, LAW, MEANING & VIOLENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE ISRAELI 
IDENTITY ON TRIAL 7-10 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2004). 
74
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss1/4
2014] Legal Cases on Posthumous Reputation and Privacy 113 
recognizing and treating different cultures rather equally. 411 
These are the reasons why most countries that have decriminalized 
defamation are mature Western democracies. However, this is not to 
say that rule of law and democracy, both respecting free speech as a 
fundamental value, can eradicate potential history censorship even in 
Western democracies. But, the non-protection of the dead's reputation 
and dignity in common law countries can block history censorship as 
justified by protection of the dead as a whole. Though the deceased's 
living family may sue to protect their own interest affiliated with the 
deceased, it offers no big chance to control information regarding the 
dead in a more systematic way. 
Protection of the dead' s dignitary interest by some continental law 
countries, in contrast, leaves a legal avenue open for state interference 
with history, even if such cases have to be waged by private parties. 
The disproportional interference of free speech rights, discussed above 
with respect to Pion, Mizzi, Lehideux, Kurzac, Gutierrez Suarez, etc., 
denotes possible history censorship, even by European democracies via 
the protection of posthumous interests. Such cases, however, verify the 
importance of a transnational court in securing free speech rights and 
preventing state censorship of history. The critical role for the ECtHR 
is to make decisions from a neutral position, away from the compelling 
pressures of domestic politics, national identities, and cultural traditions. 
The contribution of the Court, therefore, lies in its juridical authority to 
bring difficult cases beyond the political and cultural limitations of 
domestic laws to meet higher standards. 
We have to understand that protection of the dead's dignity is a 
well-justified end, since in many cultures the dead and their dignity are 
important, and law has to protect the related interests both of the living 
and the deceased. Law is a product of culture, and the values and 
morals of a particular culture should be respected in pursuit of human 
rights. The next section explains the reasons why reputations of the 
dead are important in some cultures, but not in others, as well as the 
resulting influence on law. 
B. Law and Culture 
The living law, Friedman said, "has its messages and functions ... 
and one purpose is to protect the people who matter in society", and 
such a protection "prevents society itself from severe structural 
411. CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION 27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 6th ed. 1994). 
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damage."412 Whether reputation and dignity of the dead deserve legal 
protection depends on a particular culture that defines social functions 
of reputation in that community. Reputation in general, according to 
Post, can be analyzed from the perspectives of honor, intangible 
property and dignity.413 Reputation, as personal, intangible property, 
corresponds more to a community of individualist nature that 
comprehends reputation as individual achievements on the free market. 
In contrast, both the understandings of reputation as honor and as 
dignity reside in communities of a more collective nature, though in 
different ways. 414 
The European continental laws represented by German law and 
French law have been established on a similar base of a communitarian 
or collective nature, stressing the value of human honor and dignity in 
more hierarchal communities. 415 Reputation as honor has deep roots in 
the two communities through their aristocratic traditions and has been 
leveled up from privileged, minority social groups, to the concept of 
mutual respects among all community members. 416 Actually, this kind 
of honor in reputation represents individuals' social status in a 
community that cannot be achieved by individual "effort and labor, [but 
as] a right to it by virtue of the status with which society endows his 
social role".417 And "the loss of honor is a loss of status and personal 
identity; the value of a good name 'ought to be more precious' than 
life. "418 
This emphasis on honor has been reflected in insult laws and 
memory laws that are popular in Europe, providing special protection 
for reputation of special groups, although as in Germany, it is "a kind of 
living fossil."419 The emphasis on human dignity and honor in 
412. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 12. 
413. Post, supra note 12, at 693 ( discussion of the concept of reputation as honor, 
personal property and dignity, which in the author's view co-exist in reputation but to 
different extents). 
414. Id. (though Post talked about common law countries, his analysis can be applied 
to other communities equally). 
415. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1284-85 (arguing that "the European culture of honor 
and dignity reaches very deep into everyday social life, covering what to us seem 
astoundingly trivial matters of civility" and describing "the dignitary cultures of civility that 
reign in both France and Germany today and traces the sources of those cultures to old 
traditions of social hierarchy."); see also Peled, supra note 79, at 779- 82 (arguing the 
communitarian tradition in German defamation law). 
416. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1384-90 ("a commitment to the broad distribution of 
honor or dignity throughout society."). 
417. Post, supra note 12, at 700. 
418. Id. at 703. 
419. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1314. 
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European jurisdictions can be witnessed both in Article One of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental rights, and in the constitutions 
of many European countries. 420 Protection of human dignity has been 
recognized by the ECtHR in past judgments, 421 and the Court regards 
human dignity as supporting other Convention rights.422 Following 
McCruden, "[h ]uman dignity has also been incorporated judicially as a 
general principle of European Community law, deriving from the 
constitutional traditions common to Member States. "423 
Since honor and dignity refer to social status of individuals, 
protection of the dead' s reputation is more comprehensible against such 
legal-social backgrounds. The dead still need to be respected because 
of dignity as past human beings, and because their social status previous 
to death shall be cherished. As the German Constitutional Court 
pointed out long ago in Mephisto, "the human dignity of the deceased 
was of overriding constitutional value" and "it would be incompatible 
with the constitutional command of the inviolability of human dignity, 
if individuals could be freely disparaged after death."424 In the decision, 
as Brugger commented elsewhere, an apparent communitarian concept 
could be found in German constitutional law. 425 
A similar treatment can be found in the Israeli Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty in 1992. According to the Supreme Court of Israel, 
the right of human dignity includes not only honor, but also reputation, 
privacy and property, among others;426 and both the right to reputation 
and the freedom of speech are derived from the mother right of human 
420. Rosier, supra note 77, at 170; see also Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of 
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 201, 216-17 (2008) (explaining Rao's 
accounts of constitutional commitment to human dignity in Germany, France, South Africa, 
and Canada, as well as in international laws). 
421. First mentioned in Tyrer v United Kingdom by the Court, involving corporal 
punishment, as against Article 3 protecting a person's dignity and physical integrity. See 
Tyrer v United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, para. 33 (E. Ct. H.R. Apr. 25, 1978), available 
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OOl-57587 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
422. Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02, para. 65 (E. Ct. H.R. July 29, 
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=OO 1-60448 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014) (ruling "the very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and human freedom); see also Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 683-84 (2008) (discussing the 
ECtHR's protection of human dignity). 
423. McCrudden, supra note 423, at 683. 
424. Rosier, supra note 77, at 177-78. 
425. See Winfried Brugger, Communitarianism as the Social and Legal Theory Behind 
the German Constitution, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 431, 433 (2004). 
426. Peled, supra note 79, at 743-44. 
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dignity.427 In analyzing the jurisprudential foundations of Israeli 
defamation law, Pe led noticed the moral influences of Jewish Law that 
"attaches significant weight to the right of reputation and treats 
defamation with great severity", and whose protection of the dead has 
been absorbed by Israeli defamation law. 428 
Peled found that the Jewish majority, as the dominating force in 
shaping the country's culture and politics before late 1970s, "was 
characterized . . . by communitarianism, collectivism and internal 
solidarity."429 He concluded that communitarianism and solidarity 
parallel with each other with an ideology that values honor greatly and 
limits freedom and liberty "in the name of moral commitment to 
society", and demands individuals' compromise.430 However after the 
late 1970s, Peled noticed the Israeli law gradually witnessed a decline in 
such collective and communitarian tendencies for a variety of 
reasons. 431 
We have to distinguish the two concepts of reputation which both 
originated from such collective communities: reputation as honor and 
reputation as dignity, which in Post's view refer to different things. 432 
Reputation as honor concerns unequal social status in honor 
communities with a deferential, hierarchical nature,433 while reputation 
as dignity refers to equal social status of community members and equal 
participation in communal issues. 434 According to Whitman, European 
communities represented by France and Germany have leveled up the 
protection of honor (reputation) of higher social classes to other social 
classes after the Second World War, so that dignity and honor belong to 
each member of a community.435 In contrast, many societies protect the 
dead's reputation more for the dead's honor and their related social 
status. The stress is to secure social order and a hierarchical structure. 
427. Id. at 748. It is worth of mentioning the plausible distinctions between 
posthumous dignity and human dignity made by Antoon De Baets. See Antoon De Baets, A 
Successful Utopia: The Doctrine of Human Dignity, 7 HISTOREIN 71 , 80- 82 (2007). 
428. Peled, supra note 79, at 773. 
429. Id. at 782-83 (pointing out three sources of the communitarianism before 1980s: 
Jewish tradition, Jewish immigrants from European societies and Arab societies which 
contained communitarian features, and the Zionist ideology with strong collectivist and 
communitarian themes). 
430. Id. at 783. 
431. Id. at 787. 
432. Post, supra note 12, at 715. 
433. See BOWMAN, supra note 12 (discussing honor cultures and communities both in 
the East and the West). 
434. Post, supra note 12 at 715. 
435. Whitman, supra note 64, at 1323, 1384 (In Whitman's terms: "an equal honor for 
all" or "a minimum of honor for all."). 
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Their laws have not yet shifted to the stage of protecting dignity of each 
human being of equal status, including equally protecting dignity of the 
deceased regardless of previous social status. 
This doctrine is well explained in honor societies in which female 
victims of rape crimes are dishonored even within their own families. 
In communities where honor killings are popular, a woman's reputation 
or honor belongs to her husband or her father, who regard her tragedy as 
a big dishonor or disrespect of their incapacity to control or protect 
her.436 As David Pryce-Jones commented, honor acts as a kind of social 
glue in a shame society and the acquisition of honor brings high status 
to the individual and the avoidance of shame is a guarantee of low 
status.437 For John Davis, the essential character of honor is a system of 
stratification, describing distribution of wealth, prescribing appropriate 
behavior of people of various social positions, entailing the acceptance 
of subordination and super-ordination.438 Reputation as honor concerns 
simply not only the individuals whose reputation is under direct 
consideration, but also their families and relatives. Such an approach 
influences social rules or civility norms in Post's terms.439 
In addition, attention shall be paid to the connection between honor 
society and collective identity. At this point, honor of a state or a 
particular racial group is collectively owned and appreciated, not 
allowed to be degraded by others. The escalating negative attitudes of 
many Russian authorities toward the Kytan tragedy, and the complaints 
from the Polish families of the deceased victims can be explained by 
changed political-cultural circumstances. Though Russia has been more 
democratized in past years, the new regime still needs a new national 
identity of self-pride and self-appreciation for unity. The over-
disclosure of past massive murders of other peoples, as in the Katyn 
tragedy, though commanded by a few communist leaders, is still a big 
shame to the new identity. 44° From this perspective, it is easy to 
436. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: How MORAL REVOLUTIONS 
HAPPEN 18 (W. W. Norton & Co. 2010). 
437. David Pryce-Jones, Shame and Honor, Terribly Twisted, NAT'L REV., (Apr. 21, 
2003) (citing Bowman, supra note 12, at 27). 
438. Post, supra note 12, at 700 (citing JOHN DAVIS, PEOPLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: 
AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 98 ( 1977) ). 
439. Id. at 710 (" ... when rules of deference and demeanor are embodied in speech, 
and hence are subject to the law of defamation, I shall call them rules of civility."). 
440. See Anne Garrels, Libel Case Sparks New Focus On Stalin's Reputation, NPR 
(Sept. 8, 2009, 3:18 PM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=l 12642329 (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014); Andrew Osborn, Josef Stalin's Grandson Loses Legal Attempt at Rehabilitating 
Soviet Dictator's Reputation, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 13, 2009, 8:29 PM), available at 
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understand why a Russian historian was arrested when he invested the 
fate of German soldiers imprisoned by Russian Security Services,441 as 
just part of a "' [p ]utinite campaign against freedom of historical 
research and expression. "'442 
In sharp contrast, communities of an individualist nature take 
reputation as personal, achieved by personal efforts and labor. It can be 
lost and regained on free market as personal, intangible property. An 
individual can reconstruct his or her own reputation and therefore, 
reputation is different from personal identity. 443 It is against this 
cultural concept that the deceased have no legal protection of reputation 
after death and their relatives and heirs cannot sue on their behalf to 
benefit from other's good reputation.444 The American approach to 
reputation is a typical individualist one hatched in an individualist 
culture.445 The individualist approach can collapse or wear out the 
collective nature of honor in reputation, given that free market and 
democracy become the dominating aurae. Market economy will re-
calculate the value of personal reputation as products of personal efforts 
and available for market exchange, while democracy requires equal 
respect of individuals in participating public issues regardless of their 
social status. 
This explains the shift of reputation concept in many societies. 
Since the late 1970s, for instance, Israeli society has witnessed the 
decline of communitarianism, collectivism and solidarity and a 
concurrent rise of individualism, at least among those people whose 
influence on the character of the State of Israel is the greatest. 446 
Among other factors, that the economic growth especially during the 
1990s increased living standards - together with the process of the 
Americanization - has strengthened individualism in Israeli community. 
This has helped maintain a liberal majority in the Supreme Court to 
attribute greater weight to freedom of speech and to embrace a liberal 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/6319755/Josef-Stalins-grandson-
loses-legal-attempt-at-rehabilitating-Soviet-dictators-reputation.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2014). 
441. Lydia Harding, Russian Historian Arrested in Clampdown on Stalin Era, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2009, l :38PM), available at 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/2009/oct/ 15/russia-gulag-historian-arrested (last visited 
Dec. 3, 2014). 
442. Id. 
443. Post, supra note 12, at 700. 
444. Iryami, supra note 19, at 1088. 
445. See Bellah, supra note 35, at 743 ("Arguing that 'America is a culture that 
focuses on the individual, a culture in which 'individualism' is a central value."). 
446. Peled, supra note 79, at 787. 
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interpretation of the constitutional protection of dignity. 447 
In China, we observe a similar tendency. The rise of "a free 
market" and capitalism has helped with prioritizing individual interests 
in daily life after the 1980s, albeit collectivism is still the official 
ideology. Nowadays more people are likely to gauge other's 
achievement (reputation) by economic achievements, and individualism 
becomes the dominant morals than collectivism. 448 Reputation is not 
only understood as honor denoting personal social status among the 
Chinese, but more as the appreciation of personal economic 
achievements and human dignity.449 Moreover, the ordinary Chinese 
have gradually recognized the economic interest in reputation and 
privacy of the dead.450 Therefore, even the ordinary Chinese start to 
resort to law for protection. 451 The growth of individualism enriches the 
understandings of reputation in China. And it motivates the Chinese to 
speak out what they think about the past communist rulings and the late 
political figures, which have caused many troubles. 452 
It is in the communitarian culture that individuals are requested to 
compromise their free expression right to protect the collective identity 
or reputation, or human dignity for public interest. Laws of such 
communities accordingly provide protection of posthumous reputation, 
when reputation is more taken as either personal honor or individual 
dignity.453 While the emphasis on both concepts could be accepted by 
447. Id. at 789- 90. 
448. See Liza G. Steele & Scott M. Lynch, The Pursuit of Happiness in China: 
Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being During China's Economic and 
Social Transformation, Soc. INDICATORS Res. 442-51 (arguing that after decades' market 
economy in China, Chinese people are increasingly prioritizing individualist factors in 
assessments of their own happiness and life satisfaction, suggesting that Chinese society 
becomes increasingly individualistic in social realities). 
449. No wonder, the introduction of rule of law and the popularity of the idea of 
human rights among the public play a role in promoting the idea of equality and dignity of 
individuals. See id. 
450. Many posthumous privacy cases are about the illegal appropriation of the dead's 
likeness and the unconsented use of their names for commercial purposes. See Zhao, supra 
note 349, at 298. 
451. See Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical 
Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT'L L. J. 34, 103 (2006) (arguing 
that the "increased use of defamation litigation by powerful parties in recent years may also 
be encouraging more ordinary individuals to assert their rights" and "Permitting such cases 
to be used to entrench local interests may be a necessary corollary or prerequisite to the 
effective use of litigation by ordinary people."). 
452. See Zhao, supra note 349, at 338. 
453. At this point, I won't discuss Muslim communities, for which the collective 
identity is of fundamental importance, in particular regarding the dead prophets and 
religious leaders. See id. 
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members of a society, it might be used as a good justification to limit 
free speech of others. Eventually, this becomes a matter of balancing 
different social interests by courts of law, which might lead to potential 
chilling effects and history censorship. 
It is better to conclude the discussion of the relationship between 
culture difference, posthumous reputation protection, and legal 
interference by quoting an observation of Rosler that "the conceptual 
and cultural embedding is decisive. "454 
VIL CONCLUSION: DEAD BUT NOT FAR AW A Y 
This article has discussed the relationship between legal protection 
of posthumous reputation and history censorship, explaining the 
interplays of law, politics and culture that contribute to the complexity 
of many posthumous defamation cases in different communities. On 
the whole, the crux of the issue is how we shall treat the dead and their 
posthumous interests, and how much compromise a community is 
willing to make to protect the deceased? As discussed above, different 
approaches can be interpreted by the characteristics of politics and 
culture of a particular community. 
Totalitarian and dictatorial states protect the dead's reputation, in 
particular the reputation of political leaders, on the ground of their 
social status, collective memory, and political legitimacy. Reputation 
and honor of the dead therefore are important values to be protected by 
their laws and free speech is usually compromised. It is also likely in 
religious communities that strictly forbid defamation of religious 
leaders and prophets. But, this is not to say that in Western democracies 
there exists no history censorship or censorship of speech regarding the 
past, or no official history or narrative is officially protected. We have 
observed that in many circumstances speeches regarding dead leaders 
and kings have been limited to different extents and some of which 
were overturned by the ECtHR as violating the right to free speech. 
This shows that free speech concerning the past may be restricted 
sporadically for various reasons in Western democracies. 
Other reasons include the protection of national honor or dignity 
by preventing insults of state leaders, or protecting national identity. 
However, the tendency in mature democracies is that there is no 
systematic censorship of history, and that with the abolition of criminal 
defamation, insult law and blasphemy law, there will be less violation of 
454. Rosier, supra note 77, at 186. 
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free speech rights of historians and journalists. Of course, the best 
practice in this regard is from common law jurisdictions, whose strong 
rejection of the protection of the dead's reputation and privacy has 
erased the potential to abuse defamation law and privacy law for history 
censorship. 
This, however, does not mean that the strong tradition in some 
European countries to respect and protect the dead's dignity shall not be 
appreciated such as in German law and Maltese law. The point is that 
there is a big danger to violate the proportionality principle when 
balancing the posthumous protection with free speech right. Protection 
of the right to free speech may yield under accumulating exigent public 
needs and political whims, as seen in memory laws in Europe, opening 
the door for future state censorship. The safest way is to walk far away 
from the slippery water bank with a clear-cut line by resembling the 
common law approach.455 Even when protection of the dead's 
reputation and dignity are regarded as highly important to a community, 
courts of law shall make judgments in favor of free speech rights, unless 
there exists real, compelling social needs, or the offense is grave and 
serious enough to endanger the fundamental value of a society affiliated 
with posthumous reputation and privacy. 
To prevent potential history censorship under this avenue, judges 
have to pay more attention to the following two issues: First, law is the 
last means, but not the best to resolve history's controversies. Judges 
are not well-equipped professional historians who can dig deep into the 
dusts of history. Actually, historians themselves run into difficulties too 
often in seeking historical truth ( or facts). Though courts may dance 
with politicians to achieve certain critical, political ends, such as 
helping with the formation of Israeli state and Zionist identity, it should 
be crystal clear that they must avoid such a political role and protect the 
independence of law, so that law's authority and independency will not 
melt down before prevailing political whims and public outcry. 
Otherwise, what comes with the postponed suspicion of judicial truth 
( or historical truth) offered in court is eventual distrust of the judiciary. 
Therefore, second, when courts have to settle posthumous defamation 
disputes regarding sensitive history, their discretion should be strictly 
455. A reason why the author is against the recent proposal to protect the dead's 
reputation by some law reform commissions in western democracies. See, e.g., Report On 
The Civil Law Of Defamation, LAW REFORM COMM'N (1991), available at 
http://www.lawreform.ie/ _fileupload/Reports/rDefamation.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2014); 
Death of a Good Name Defamation and the Deceased: A Consultation Paper, SCOTTISH 
Gov'T, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/01/11092246/0 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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limited to decide whether the accused authors have sufficient evidence 
to support controversial statements, and whether they have conducted 
research according to acceptable academic manners. 
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